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Nepal’s age-old ethnic grievances created a platform for the Maoists to launch their 
political strategy into broad sections of Nepalese society. The explicit politicization of 
ethnic grievances helped propel the party to victory in Nepal’s first constitutional election 
in 2008. Soon thereafter, however, the Maoists lost the lead role in Nepalese politics, in 
no small part because they failed to deliver on their ethnic promises.  
This thesis examines the rise and fall of the Maoists in Nepal, as well as the 
sources and context of the ethnic grievances that have simmered in the country 
throughout its modern political history. It finds that genuine reform has collided with 
(and frequently lost out to) the short-term agitations of power politics across the partisan 
spectrum. In this context, the present thesis establishes a framework to understand the 
role of ideas in democratizing states. The clash between ideas and ideology on the matter 
of ethnic grievances sheds light on how the Maoists failed to convert the claims of their 
movement into the actions of their party in government. 
The lesson for the remaining parties is clear: resolving Nepal’s ethnic tensions is a 
matter of ongoing urgency in the country’s democratization. 
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The Maoist insurgency in Nepal had many underlying reasons. However, as 
Deepak Thapa explains, the tendency of Nepal’s elite classes and ruling regime to 
overlook or underplay the genuine problems of the people certainly marked a key factor 
in escalating the insurgency.1 In contrast, the Maoist party in Nepal gathered followers 
during and after the civil war (1996–2006), in part on the promise of democracy and a 
Maoist solution to ethnic differences in the country. This vision resonated with wide 
swathes of society. During the height of its popularity, the Maoist Party won 220 seats in 
the first constituent election held in 2008.  
The party’s failure to resolve ethnic grievances contributed significantly to its 
defeat in the 2013 elections. Today, it is the third-largest party in the Constituent 
Assembly (CA) with 80 seats—140 fewer seats than they had won in the first constituent 
assembly election. The Maoists can claim to have effected or co-authored some lasting 
and important changes in Nepal, but their larger role in the country’s democratic 
transition remains unclear.  
The Maoists’ vow to promote better representation of the poor farmers and to 
champion all Nepal’s downtrodden groups earned them popular support among the 
marginalized people. That is to say that the Maoists were able to use the ethnic 
grievances of the people to achieve their political gains. However, when Maoists 
themselves were in power, they made less effort to address issues related to ethnic 
grievances, confronted with the practical exigencies of running a battered state just 
emerging from civil conflict on the one hand and, on the other, reverting to policy 
preferences more in accord with their core ideology, which did not share such broad 
support. From the citizens’ perspective, the Maoists in power seemed not much different 
from any other political party, particularly in regard to ethnic grievances. The rise in 
popular disenchantment with the Maoists coincided with the decline in the party’s 
political fortunes—and still the ethnic problems remain largely unaddressed.  
1 Deepak Thapa and Bandita Sijapati, A Kingdom under Siege: Nepal’s Maoist Insurgency, 1996 to 
2003 (Kathmandu: The Printhouse, 2003), 97.   
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
How did the Maoists use ethnic grievances to achieve their shorter-term political 
goal of attaining power but then fall into a mismatch between ideology, ideas, political 
practice, and popular aspiration about ethnic grievances that has cost the Maoists their 
leadership role in Nepali politics today? And what are the implications for Nepal’s 
democratic transition? 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The research question explores not only the Maoists’ use of ethnic grievances to 
attain political goals but also the related aspects of democratic transitions that were never 
completely functional in Nepal. According to Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, 
in democracy, the relationship between “rulers and the ruled” must be smooth.2 So far, 
Nepalese politics has not achieved this state, even after its most recent transition.  
They go on to say that successful democracy involves democratic consolidation, a 
situation where a “majority rule to protect minority rights,”3 is sine qua non. The role of 
political parties in democracy is significant and the even distribution of power across 
different branches of the system is another important feature of democracy. For these 
reasons, the earlier democratic experiments have gone down in history as incomplete, at 
best. Bishnu Raj Upreti notes that as party politics started to overshadow the national 
politics of Nepal after 1990, “social exclusion, acute inequalities, absolute poverty, and 
failure of political structures to address these issues”4 pushed Nepal into further 
uncertainty. The prospect of democratic consolidation, Leonardo Morlino argues, asserts 
itself “the process by which the democratic regime is strengthened,”5 was at its ebb even 
2 Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, “What Democracy Is … And Is Not,” in Transition to 
Democracy: Comparative Perspectives from Southern Europe, Latin America and Eastern Europe, ed. 
Geoffrey Pridham (Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1995), 76. 
3 Schmitter and Karl, “What Democracy Is,” 79.  
4 Bishnu Raj Upreti, Political Change and Challenges of Nepal vol. 2: Reflection on Armed Conflict, 
Peace Process and State Building (Saarbrucken, Germany: LAP Lambert Academic Publishing, 2010), 13. 
5 Leonardo Morlino, “Democratic Consolidation: Definition and Models,” in Transition to 
Democracy: Comparative Perspectives from Southern Europe, Latin America and Eastern Europe, ed. 
Geoffrey Pridham (Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1995), 573.  
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after 1990s, as party politics with their specific agendas dominated the national agenda to 
the exclusion of new and difficult popular priorities. The Maoist insurgency was a 
product of this situation.  
The present research seeks to establish a framework to understand the role of 
ideas in democratizing states as they reflect different parties’ manifestos and 
representatives. Ideas and ideologies buoyed the Maoists in their early days in Nepal, and 
at least to some extent, the clash between ideas and ideology on the matter of ethnic 
grievances sheds light on how the Maoists failed to convert the claims of their movement 
into the actions of their party in government.  
These issues are of interest in the broader context of democratic consolidation, 
particularly in South Asia because the issue of “social organizations such as caste and 
ethnic and religious communities,”6 according to Maya Chadda has always been 
dominant in the political system of many South Asian nations. Nepal is not an exception 
to this trend. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The history of modern Nepal begins in 1768–1769. Marie Lecomte-Tilouine 
describes King Prithvi Narayan Shah’s vision: “a real Hindu Kingdom for the four 
classes … and for the 36 castes.”7 All social, ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural 
divisions were to give way to this new unifying order. Tilouine goes on to say that the 
notion of these social striations, somehow united under one flag, prevailed in Nepal 
through the first democracy in 1950–1960 and on until 1990, when social upheaval, 
under the banner of the People’s Movement, successfully pressed for a multiparty 
government and, more specifically, a new Nepalese constitution.8 However, according to 
6 Maya Chadda, Building Democracy in South Asia: India, Nepal, Pakistan (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2000), 2. 
7 Marie Lecomte-Tilouine, Hindu Kingship, Ethnic Revival, and Maoist Rebellion in Nepal (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 82. 
8 Ibid.  
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Tilouine, this document also defined Nepal as “a multiethnic, multilinguistic, democratic, 
free, indivisible, sovereign, Hindu Kingdom ruled by constitutional monarchy.”9  
The people of Nepal expected that with the restoration of democracy in the 1990s, 
the conventions of state discrimination based on religion, ethnicity, and language would 
end. Susan Hangen points out that politicians paid lip service10 to this ideal with words 
like “multiethnic” and “multilingual,” which, according to Deepak Thapa, did not put an 
end to state discrimination.11 Thapa continues that, having aroused but failing to fulfill 
the desire of people to have “radical social transformation … after 30 years of 
authoritarianism,”12 Nepal’s new rulers faced increasingly unstable politics. He asserts 
that the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists) exploited this turmoil in 1996, and launched 
their violent armed struggle in the name of revolution and People’s War.13  
Much research regarding the Maoists in Nepal speaks to the genesis of the 
movement and details the atrocities, violence, and economic destruction brought by the 
insurgency. In general, the literature holds that Nepal’s Maoist period marked a “rare 
exception to the contemporary global trend under which”14 democratic transitions were 
the result of a “decline of communism and ascendancy of neo-liberalism,”15 according to 
R. Andrew Nickson. He maintains that in Nepal, in contrast, the political “alliance 
between centrist Nepali Congress party and a grouping of seven communist party”16 
came together to end the monarch’s direct rule in the 1990s and in 2005.  
9 Lecomte-Tilouine, Hindu Kingship, Ethnic Revival, 82. 
10 Susan I. Hangen, The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Nepal: Democracy in the Margins (New York: 
Routledge, 2010), 22.  
11 Deepak Thapa, “The Making of The Maoist Insurgency” in Nepal in Transition: From People’s 
War to Fragile Peace, eds. Sebastian von Einsiedel, David M. Malone, and Suman Pradhan (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 48. 
12 Ibid.   
13 Ibid.   
14 R. Andrew Nickson, “Democratisation and the Growth of Communism in Nepal: A Peruvian 
Scenario in the Making” in Understanding the Maoist Movement of Nepal, ed. Deepak Thapa (Kathmandu: 




                                                 
For the most part, the story is told entirely from the political vantage. Rather less 
of the scholarship focuses on the underlying cultural and social fissures in Nepalese 
society; as such, ethnic grievances and other such divisions remain under-explored in the 
relevant literature. This thesis hopes to close this gap. In order to achieve the objective of 
the paper, this section briefly touches on the salient aspects of the topics, that is, 
democracy, democratic transitions and democratic consolidation, the democratic 
transition in Nepal, the Maoist insurgency, and ethnic grievances.  
 Democracy, Democratic Transition, and Democratic Consolidation 1.
According to Ramjee P. Parajulee, the democratization process varies from 
country to country and also from region to region, depending on “social, economic, 
political, cultural, and international factors.”17 In this connection, Chadda posits that the 
wider domain of democracy in South Asia suggests that it is some sort of “trade-off 
between territorial consolidation, regime stability and economic growth.”18 Narayan 
Khada asserts that Nepal, established as a nation state in 1769, had to struggle to keep its 
independence and maintain internal cohesion, as well, amid the infighting between 
different interest groups within the palace.19  
Similarly, the book Building Democracy in South Asia by Maya Chadda notes 
that Nepal’s democracy, from its initial stage in 1950s, started struggling to consolidate 
and balance fights among three groups: the palace, the political parties, and the traditional 
elite class.20 Chadda writes that each group was more interested in ganging up against 
one another to become powerful, which he compares to Machiavelli’s principle of 
“divide and conquer.”21 Ultimately, these early reformers mostly conquered themselves 
and Nepal’s democracy was set back again.  
17 Ramjee P. Parajulee, The Democratic Transition in Nepal (Boston: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 7.   
18 Chadda, Building Democracy in South Asia, 111.    
19 Narayan Khadka, “Crisis in Nepal’s Partyless Panchayat System: The Case for More Democracy” 
in Pacific Affairs 59, no. 3 (Autumn, 1986): 429, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2758328. 
20 Chadda, Building Democracy in South Asia, 54.  
21 Ibid.   
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Schmitter and Karl note that democracy encompasses many institutions that are 
shaped by particular countries’ “socioeconomic conditions as well as its entrenched state 
structures and policy practices.”22 Samuel P. Huntington, in his book The Third Wave, 
asserts that “as a form of government, democracy has been defined in terms of sources of 
authority for government, purposes served by government, and procedures for 
constitution[al] government.”23 Likewise, Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl in 
What Democracy Is explain democracy as a “system of governance in which rulers are 
held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly 
through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives.”24 These two 
definitions have one thing in common—the legitimacy of the government and its 
accountability to its people.  
Even though the basic norms of democracy remain the same in all democratic 
countries, Joseph T. Siegle, Michael M. Weinstein, and Morton H. Halperin reveal that 
some states, which have come more recently to democratization, particularly poor 
countries, prefer the notion of “development first, democracy later.”25 To further 
elucidate this point, they asserts that “economic growth creates the necessary 
preconditions for democracy,”26 meaning that such growth allows “expanding literacy, 
creating a secure middle class and nurturing cosmopolitan attitudes,”27 which play a 
significant part in democracy. David Beetham maintains that the end of democratic 
transition is expected to lead to democratic consolidation once the formation of a newly 
elected government, after a free and fair election, takes place.28 
22 Schmitter and Karl, “What Democracy Is,” 76.    
23 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, 
OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 6.  
24 Schmitter and Karl, “What Democracy Is,” 76.     
25 Joseph T. Siegle, Michael M. Weinstein, and Morton H. Halperin, “Why Democracies Excel,” in 
Foreign Affairs 83, no. 5 (September–October 2004): 57, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20034067. 
26 Ibid.  
27 Ibid.  
28 David Beetham, “Conditions for Democratic Consolidation,” in Review of African Political 
Economy 21, no. 60 (June 1994): 159, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4006202.   
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However, because a transition prompts a country to experience a new set of ideas 
and habits, transition may take a long time. Dankwart A. Rustov, like other scholars, 
argues, “one generation is probably the minimum period of transition.”29 Democratic 
transition is a time-consuming process. It cannot be achieved just for one specific sector 
or group of people; rather, it requires the confluence of efforts and “attitudes on the part 
of politician and of the common citizen.”30 Because of this reality, if such conditions do 
not occur, then the country may face severe consequences—as is the case in Nepal. 
According to Shiva Bahadur Singh, the failure of “successive governments since 1990, to 
bring genuine democracy and extensive development”31 eventually created a fertile 
environment for the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) Maoists to launch their 
insurgency.  
Leonardo Morlino explains that democratic consolidation is “understood as the 
process of establishing and adapting democratic structures and norms.”32 Furthermore, 
Larry Diamond points out that especially, for the democratic consolidation of a “fragile 
or new democracy,”33 three components are crucial: “democratic deepening, political 
institutionalization, and regime performance.”34 Each of these components has its 
significance in the democratic consolidation process. The democratic deepening makes 
democracy “accountable, representative and accessible.”35 Likewise, political 
institutionalization will employ “common rules and procedures”36 for every kind of 
29 Dankwart A.Rustov, “Transition to Democracy toward Dynamic model” in Transition to 
Democracy Comparative Perspectives from Southern Europe, Latin America and Eastern Europe, ed. 
Geoffrey Pridham (Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1995), 347.   
30 Ibid., 360.  
31 Shiv Bahadur Singh, Nepal: Struggle for Democracy (New Delhi: Adhyan Publishers, 2007), 267. 
32 Morlino, “Democratic Consolidation,” 574.    
33 Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy towards Consolidation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2011), 74.  
34 Ibid.  
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid., 75.  
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political activity.37 With that said, political institutionalization and democratic deepening 
complement any regime’s “effective performance.”38  
In the broader understanding, Diamond defines consolidation as the “deep, 
unquestioned, routinized commitment to democracy and its procedures at the elite and 
mass levels,”39 meaning that all the people will “routinely, instinctively conform to the 
written (and unwritten) rules of the game, even when they conflict and compete 
intensely.”40 Furthermore, a general belief among the “elites, organizations, and the mass 
public”41 in democratic practices is a must for consolidation. Perhaps most helpfully, 
Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan’s five arenas explain the importance of democratic 
consolidation: a free and lively civil society, a political society, a rule of law, a usable 
bureaucracy, and an economic society.  
a. A Free and Lively Civil Society 
The essence of civil society relies on the choice of freedom that an individual or 
specific group will likely endure for their betterment. This liberty of freedom does not fit 
with the policy of a nondemocratic regime as was the case in South America, and 
European communist countries.42 The range of civil society starts from individual or 
ordinary citizens to the associations and groupings affiliated with various aspects of 
political as well as “social strata (such as trade unions, entrepreneurial groups, journalists, 
or lawyers).”43 Furthermore, the voice of an individual becomes stronger only when it 
makes some space within any specific group, hence the role of free and lively civil 
society is important for the consolidation of democracy.  
37 Diamond, Developing Democracy, 75. 
38 Ibid., 76.  
39 Ibid., 65.     
40 Ibid.   
41 Ibid.   
42 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problem of the Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern 
Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 7.   
43 Ibid.   
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b. Political Society 
In democracy, it is essential for political stakeholders to have the “legitimate right 
to exercise control over public power and the state apparatus,”44 meaning that they are 
the ultimate decision-makers as they are elected by the people and represent their voices 
or concerns. The involvement of political society complemented by civic or social society 
is a must for the consolidation of democracy as civil society alone can overthrow the 
“nondemocratic regime,”45 but cannot consolidate it in isolation.46 On the same note, the 
civic society that selects and monitors a democratic government must appreciate 
“democratic political society, political parties, elections, electoral rules, political 
leadership, interparty alliances and legislatures”47 as they remain the crucial aspect of 
democracy and are the bases for democratic consolidation. Failure to achieve this 
condition could lead the nation to conflict.  
c. Rule of Law 
Rule of law, as one of the paramount components of democracy, is also an 
integral part of the development of an ideal civil and political society.48 Democratic 
consolidation progresses only when all the stakeholders’ persons or institutions in a 
democratic country will respect and abide by the laws.49 Furthermore, democracy always 
aspires to function best on constitutional norms, which take precedence over majority-
based policies, because constitutional practices encompass the spirit of democracy that 
would be compatible to many.50  
44 Linz and Stepan, Problem of the Democratic Transition, 8.    
45 Ibid.    
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid., 10.  
49 Ibid.   
50 Ibid.   
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d. Usable Bureaucracy  
A democratic government always seeks to have a strong and legitimate 
bureaucracy that implements, monitors, and delivers service inherent in the government 
policies so as to meet the demands of people.51 Such prerequisites for the consolidation 
of democracy as an “independent civil society, an autonomous political society with 
consensus of governance and constitution, and rule of law”52 can only operate if there is 
a functioning bureaucracy for democratic leaders and a stable economy.53 If such 
conditions do not exist, then democracy will be overshadowed by the rising expectations 
of the people. Therefore, modern democracy requires a “capacity to command, regulate, 
and extract”54 resources so as to govern the political system of a particular nation. 
However, in a newly democratic country, members of the old regime holding key 
positions in the state bureaucracy tend to be reluctant to deliver services to the people as 
expected.55  
e. Economic Society 
According to Linz and Stepan, democracy cannot be consolidated in either of two 
extreme conditions: a “command economy and a pure market economy.”56 They further 
assert that the strong presence of an economic society, which “mediates between the state 
and the market,”57 is required for the consolidation of democracy. Economic society 
according to them is a set of “socio-politically accepted norms, institutions, and 
regulation.”58 Furthermore, they insist that a “socially and politically institutionalized 
regulated market”59 is vital for the consolidation of democracy.  
51 Linz and Stepan, Problem of the Democratic Transition, 11.   
52 Ibid., 10 
53 Ibid. 







                                                 
This crucial consolidation of democracy is not so easy to achieve. In this regard, 
Samuel P. Huntington’s explanation of the various difficulties that countries might have 
to face especially during the regime changes outlines problems associated with 
democratic consolidation. These problems include  
establishing new constitutional and electoral system, weeding out 
proauthoritarian officials and replacing them with democratic ones, 
repealing or modifying laws that were unsuitable for democracy, 
abolishing or drastically changing, authoritarian agencies such as the 
secret police, and, in former one-party system, separating party and 
government property, functions, and personnel.60  
Morlino notes that achieving democratic consolidation through a strong regime 
whether in an authoritarian or a democratic system is tough in the environment where 
“political instability, corruption, clientelism, inefficient taxation and confusion on [the] 
hierarchy principle,” prevails.61 Upreti mentions that this situation remained crucial in 
Nepal’s case especially from 1990 to 1996, when “corruption, politicization of the 
bureaucracy, police force and intelligence”62 hampered democratic consolidation, and 
eventually led the nation to face Maoist armed conflict.  
 Maoist Insurgency 2.
The Maoist insurgency of Nepal, which was fought in the name of the people’s 
war, and which, according to Tioluine, “attracted worldwide attention both for its bloody 
aftermath and its anachronism,”63 contradicts many doctrinal aspects of Maoism itself. 
James Chieh Hsiung mentions that Mao Tse Tung is considered as a good “engineer of 
communism, successfully applying its theory into Chinese reality”64—a war-ravaged and 
impoverished largely agricultural state. According to Hugh Seton-Watson, the Chinese 
revolutionary struggle was “fought not at the urban center (as in Petrograd in 1917), but 
60 Huntington, The Third Wave, 209.   
61 Morlino, “Democratic Consolidation,” 579.   
62 Upreti, Political Change and Challenges, 13.   
63 Lecomte-Tilouine, Hindu Kingship, Ethnic Revival, 3. 
64 James Chieh Hsiung, The Logic of Maoism (New York: Praeger, 1974), 1. 
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at the rural periphery.”65 He further says that the Chinese revolution was overwhelmingly 
joined and mounted by peasants as opposed to the Russian case, where the “working 
class of Petrograd played a decisive role.”66 In sum, as Hsiung posits, China’s “own 
successful national liberation struggle”67 and its support for the people’s war was unique. 
Furthermore, Chalmers A. Johnson suggests, in China, Maoists aligned even with the 
“noncommunist nationalist group”68 and made a united front with Chiang Kai Shek in 
1927 against Japanese colonialism. This development further proves that Maoism 
included many activities that, says Hsiung, were not “within normal Marxist patterns of 
actions and institutions.”69  
Hsuing mentions that out of many theoretical connotations of the People’s War in 
China, securing support of the masses was the major focus of the communist Party and its 
army.70 Thapa asserts that in Nepal’s case, people were not motivated but terrorized by 
Maoist atrocities. The Maoists blamed other political parties, including the communist 
parties, for being revisionist and reactionary.71 Therefore, Nepal’s Maoist insurgency 
contradicts the nature of the People’s war of China. The Maoist insurgency, as Shantosh 
B. Poudyal posits, gained momentum not through ideological motives but from social 
problems that “led to further alienation of the marginalized people.”72  
 Ethnic Grievances 3.
Donald L. Horowitz, in his Ethnic Groups in Conflict, notes that in a society 
where there are many ethnicities, issues related to ethnicity appear in various forms, for 
65 Seton-Watson Hugh, “The Russian and Chinese Revolutions” The China Quarterly, no. 2 (April–
June 1960): 45, http://www.jstor.org/stable/651439 . 
66 Ibid., 44–45.  
67 Hsiung, The Logic of Maoism, 89.  
68 Chalmers A. Johnson, Autopsy on People’s War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), 
14.  
69 Hsiung, The Logic of Maoism, 1. 
70 Ibid., 89.  
71Thapa and Sijapati, A Kingdom under Siege, 45. 
72 Shantosh B. Poudyal, “Explaining the Success of Nepal Communist Party—(NCP-M): A 
Comparison of the Maoist Insurgencies in the 21st Century” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
2010), 67. 
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example, “development plans, educational controversies, trade union affairs, land policy, 
business policy, tax policy.”73 Furthermore, Lipset argues that because “effectiveness and 
legitimacy”74 remain vital in democracy, if a new political system fails to fulfill the 
“expectations of major groups (on the grounds of effectiveness) for [a] long enough 
period to develop legitimacy upon the new basis, a new crisis may develop.”75 Along this 
line, if people are pushed to an extreme condition where they feel isolated from the state, 
at one point in time they tend to lose the “tolerance of opinions,”76 Lipset maintains. 
Such a situation makes people vulnerable to exploitation by any specific group or 
community. This description coincides with Nepal’s case, where the marginalized 
minorities were not happy with the state even after the restoration of democracy in 1990 
and fueled the Maoist insurgency from 1996 to 2006.  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
I acknowledge that modern Nepal’s path to democratic consolidation has been 
characterized by many upheavals, whether it was during the 104-year Rana oligarchy, or 
the 30 years of the party-less panchayat system, or the 10 years of the Maoist insurgency. 
However, I hypothesize that the deeply “entrenched social discrimination”77 and under-
representation of marginalized ethnicities, particularly amid the language and practice of 
state discrimination, made a favorable environment for the rise of the Maoist 
insurgency.78 In light of the Maoists’ declining political popularity, I further hypothesize 
that Nepal’s democratic progress and stability depends on real and enduring solutions to 
ethnic grievances, which can only come about with a thorough understanding of how 
these issues operate in Nepalese history, culture, and politics.  
73 Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 8.  
74 Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1988), 65.  
75 Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, 65.   
76 Ibid., 77.  
77 Upreti, Political Change and Challenges, 13.   
78 Ibid.   
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E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research incorporates relative dimensions of democracy, Maoist insurgency, 
and the role of ethnic grievances to augment conflict while establishing the arguments on 
how Maoists used ethnic grievances to achieve political goals. The thesis begins with the 
background of democracy and the struggle for consolidation under different regimes (the 
Rana oligarchy, the panchayat system, and the multiparty democracy between 1990 and 
2002). This chapter also covers the state of democracy during the Maoist insurgency.  
Then the thesis turns to the ethnic grievances that simmered beneath the surface 
of Nepal’s political scene, including how the marginalized ethnic communities were 
discriminated against on the basis of religion, caste, and language, leaving huge 
opportunity for social resentment towards the central authority. The same section sheds 
light on how such resentment serves to elevate conflicts in countries. Then, the thesis 
examines the use of these ethnic grievances as a tool by the Maoists to achieve their 
political goals. Also at issue are the ways in which ethnic divisions do and do not accord 
with Maoist ideology at its core, which may further explain the later disconnect between 
the leadership and the Maoists’ supporters, particularly once the party took the lead of the 
post-conflict government.  
The thesis concludes with some observations, based on the findings of these 
chapters, on the relevance of these “grass-roots” issues in democratic transition and 
consolidation and the way forward for Nepal.  
 14 
II. DEMOCRATIC STRUGGLE IN NEPAL 
 
The democratic struggle in Nepal began when the 200 years of British rule in 
India in ended in 1947. Nepal, the only nation in South Asia not colonized by any 
country, missed out on the democratizing trends in the region, however. Dilli Raman 
Regmi states that during this time, when many countries were developing their social, 
political, and economic life, Nepalese society was overwhelmingly controlled by the 
“consolidated and integrated feudal force.”79 Such a ruling system severely affected the 
country both politically and economically. The prospect of democracy and development 
in the country was further diminished, and Nepal’s political and developmental spheres 
were isolated from world affairs for long periods of time.  
A. NEPALESE POLITICS BEFORE 1951 
As Nepalese history shows, from the time of its unification in 1769 until 1816, the 
country was involved in consolidating its territory internally and externally.80 Internally, 
many small principalities within Nepal were conquered. Externally, Nepal fought many 
battles on different fronts with the British East India Company from 1814 to 1816, 
collectively known as the Anglo-Nepal War.81 At the same time, Nepal could not 
establish a firm ruling system within the country because of in-fighting among influential 
circles within the palace.82  
Throughout the years (especially before 1951), various rulers failed to promote 
democracy partly because the country was not exposed to the world and its influences, 
but also because the rulers were more focused on strengthening their rule than in 
79 D. R. Regmi, The Nepali Democratic Struggle: Its Aim and Character (statement to the Nepali 
Natinoal [sic] Congress, 1948), 1.  
80 Leo E. Rose and John T. Scholz, Nepal: Profile of a Himalayan Kingdom (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1980), 16–17. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid., 22–23. 
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empowering the people.83 Nepal’s modern history, particularly under Shah and Rana 
rule, has many political implications in Nepal.  
 Shah Rule 1.
The King of Gorkha, Prithvi Narayan Shah, who continued Nepal’s expansion 
after conquering the Kathmandu Valley, unified Nepal. According to Shiva Bahadur 
Singh, Nepalese society after the unification of Nepal consisted of “several small, 
isolated, non-literate and homogeneous groups, whose members tended towards strict 
conformance to the norms of the folk.”84 The rationale of such a ruling system during 
this time exemplifies that rather than a democratic governing system, Nepal relied on a 
traditional ruling system  
In Nepal, the Shah and Rana rulers are considered to have enjoyed their rule 
either backed by religious or by traditional norms rather than by popular consent of the 
people.85 Satish Kumar asserts that in order to consolidate their power, the Shah rulers 
relied on courtiers and four Kajis (Kaji was the title given by monarchs to special 
castes).
86 They were the king’s trusted confidants and acted as a “cabinet collectively 
responsible to the monarch for the civil and military administration of the country.”87 To 
keep their hold on the king, the Shah rulers concentrated their efforts on either managing 
or marginalizing different courtiers within the palace.  
The king’s trusted courtiers were not elected nor did they represent the people’s 
aspirations; there was no direct communication between the rulers (the kings) and the 
people. As the courtiers were not accountable to the people, their advice to the king 
would not incorporate the expectations of the people.88  
83 Singh, Nepal: Struggle for Democracy, 19–20.   
84 Ibid., 27.   
85 Ibid., 29–30. 
86 Satish Kumar, “The Nepalese Monarchy from 1769 to 1951,” International Studies 4, no. 1 (1962): 
49, doi:10.1177/002088176200400103. 
87 Ibid.  
88 Ibid., 52. 
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However, the Shah rulers alone cannot be blamed for ignoring the democratic 
claim of the people while ruling the country. Especially after the dawn of Rana oligarchy 
rule, the political system of Nepal transformed into a hereditary ruling system.89 This 
development diminished any prospects for democracy in Nepal. 
 Rana Rule 2.
The Rana dictatorship, which lasted for nearly 104 years (1846 to 1951), is seen 
in Nepal’s history as a major setback for the country’s democratic quest. Ramji P. 
Parajulee posits that the originator and first prime minister of the Rana regime, Jung 
Bahadur Rana, sought to “consolidate his power by purging hundreds of his opponents 
and rivals and appointing his brothers and relatives to various key political and military 
posts.”90 Likewise, Louise Brown mentions that Jung Bahadur and his successors are 
believed to have controlled the free activities of monarchs and they also directed future 
monarchs by getting them involved in what she calls “debauchery at an early and 
impressionable age.”91 The Rana carried out all these activities to keep the monarchs out 
of politics. In 1847, the Ranas took over executive power in the country, and the Shah 
kings were treated as mere figureheads.92  
As Leo E. Rose and John T. Scholz explain, the Rana regime was centered on 
family politics; they garnered support from the British East India Company in India so 
that their autocracy could not be opposed by the people inside Nepal.93 Even if the people 
would have dared to resist Rana rule, they would have been easily crushed by the rulers, 
backed by the British East India Company’s assistance to the Ranas.94 The British may 
have opted to support the Ranas because they were worried that any internal struggles or 
89 Rose and Scholz, Nepal: Profile of a Himalayan Kingdom, 29–31. 
90 Parajulee, The Democratic Transition in Nepal, 32.   
91 Louise Brown, The Challenge to Democracy in Nepal (New York, US: Routledge, 1995), 5. 
92 Parajulee, The Democratic Transition in Nepal, 32.  
93 Rose and Scholz, Nepal: Profile of a Himalayan Kingdom, 28–29. 
94 Ibid.  
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movement for democracy in Nepal might spill over into India, where people might 
oppose British rule in India.95  
Rose and Scholz notes that internally, Ranas were focused on the issue of the 
succession of the prime minister and severe divisions among themselves as they 
classified themselves in A, B, and C categories.96 This division was initiated by the 
ruling Rana family, which not surprisingly grouped itself into class A (elite); other Ranas 
fell into class B (medium) and class C (low). This hierarchy was intended to keep the 
succession for prime ministers only to class A Ranas or the ruling Rana family.97 
Moreover, S. C. Lohani asserts that the reign of the Rana regime and its political 
ambitions in Nepal are believed to have pioneered feudalism.98 As a result, the impact of 
power-centered politics was the hampering of Nepal’s economic, social, and political 
spheres. Hence, all those power-consolidating measures adopted by the Shahs and Rana 
rulers in Nepal diminished the democratic set of ruling in Nepal.  
B. BRIEF DEMOCRATIC PRACTICES OF NEPAL 
As Brown highlights, there was no formal education or free political activities 
during the active rule of the Shahs and, most importantly, during the Rana rule, Nepal 
was locked in a “time warp from which the country emerged in 1951 totally unprepared 
to face the modern world.”99 Hence, as Brown observes, it is often argued that Nepal’s 
democratic foundation was never free from the old ruling system; even if there were 
democratic movements, they only changed the actors, not the system itself.100  As a 
result, the country experienced various forms of unstable political situations even after 
democracy arrived—briefly—in 1951. 
  
95 Rose and Scholz, Nepal: Profile of a Himalayan Kingdom, 30–31. 
96 Ibid., 31–32.  
97 Ibid. 
98 S. C. Lohani, “The Birth of Rana Feudalism in Nepal,” Ancient Nepal 8 (1989), 49, 
http://himalaya.socanth.cam.ac.uk/collections/journals/ancientnepal/pdf/ancient_nepal_08_07.pdf. 
99 Brown, The Challenge to Democracy, 13.   
100 Ibid., 23–24. 
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 Political Change and Party Politics 1.
The end of the Rana oligarchy in 1951 opened the door for democratic practices 
in Nepalese politics. Parajulee maintains that tripartite talks among the King, the Nepali 
Congress, and the Ranas101 allowed political change in the country. Similarly, Singh 
argues that during same time, “King Tribhuvan, accompanied by the important leaders of 
the Nepali Congress (NC) and its Mukti Sena, reached Kathmandu as the first democratic 
King of Nepal.”102 Parajulee assert that even though the tripartite talks were seen as a 
“Delhi compromise,” as they were brokered by India, the session undoubtedly initiated 
democratic changes in Nepal.103 After 1951, three prominent, politically influenced 
entities emerged in Nepalese politics: the monarchy, the Nepali Congress, and the Ranas. 
These three entities represented three different interest of the society. Brown notes that 
the monarchy, sidelined by the Ranas, and with special religious status in Hindu 
mythology, was able to reclaim its political power in the palace.104  
Still, the Ranas, who represented a feudal class, could not be totally unseated by 
the anti-Rana movement; hence, “rather than a revolution,” Brown points out, “Nepal … 
experienced a ‘restoration’ accompanied by a reshuffling of the elite.”105 Thus, the Ranas 
remained an influential political circle even after their formal rule waned. Likewise, the 
NC, which led the armed anti-Rana regime, represented the revolutionary motive of the 
people.106 With these three political entities representing three specific interests of 
society, conflicts of interest were bound to arise in the future. To avoid the looming 
conflict among the main political stakeholders, Parajulee explains that India and King 
Tribhuvan asked the Ranas and the Nepali Congress to work together.107 However, such 
a partnership could not last long.  
101 Parajulee, The Democratic Transition in Nepal, 40.  
102 Singh, Nepal: Struggle for Democracy, 54.  
103 Parajulee, The Democratic Transition in Nepal, 40. 
104 Brown, The Challenge to Democracy, 23. 
105 Ibid., 23. 
106 Parajulee, The Democratic Transition in Nepal, 40. 
107 Ibid. 
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The tussle between the Rana rulers and the NC party increased because both 
parties had different political and social interests. In other words, Nepal’s political system 
was fragmented right from the beginning in regards to its democratic practices.  
However, with the dawn of democracy, Nepalese political parties for the first time 
were freely practicing party politics after 104 years of autocratic rule. With the change of 
political system in the country, Singh maintains that the NC promoted several political 
reforms, for example, the “maintenance of law and order, the establishment of Gram 
Panchayat and spread of education and other welfare programme.”108 Furthermore, 
Parajulee notes that to lead the country into the path of democracy with a firm set of 
rules, Nepal passed its first Interim Government Act.109 This moment marked the 
initiation of democratic practice in Nepal.  
The political parties, especially the NC, were in the limelight as they led the anti-
Rana movement. People believed the NC would effect political, social, and economic 
changes. Bhuwan Chandra Upreti notes that the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN), which 
opposed the Delhi agreement, wanted more reforms implemented in Nepal.110 In fact, the 
polarization of the centrist and leftist political ideologue hit Nepalese politics 
immediately after the country got democracy in 1951.111 As the political stakeholders 
during that period, focused on consolidating power, the political situation of the country 
got worse. Under such circumstances, democratic norms in the country could not be 
established. 
 Palace-Parliament Row 2.
Although democracy replaced an autocratic Rana regime, and democracy was 
meant to be the common theme of the king and the Political parties, the reality was not 
the same. The power-centered politics destabilized the political situation of the country. 
Political power centers were more determined to solidify their position than to deliver 
108 Singh, Nepal: Struggle for Democracy, 54.   
109 Parajulee, The Democratic Transition in Nepal, 41.  
110 Bhuwan Chandra Upreti, Maoists in Nepal: From Insurgency to Political Mainstream (Satyawati 
Nagar, Delhi, India: Kalpaz, 2008). 15.   
111 Ibid., 15–16. 
 20 
                                                 
democratic services to the people. In such situation as Rose and Scholz notes, there was a 
row between the palace and the parliament in Nepalese politics.112 Einsiedel, Malone, 
and Pradhan illustrate this power play: “The monarchy firmly clawed power back not 
only from the still entrenched Rana clan but also from the nascent and idealistic political 
parties.”113 In addition, as quoted by Parajulee, King Tribhuvan’s declaration of the 
absolute power of monarchy on February 13, 1954, further asserted the rising political 
quest of the palace in Nepalese politics:  
The inherent sovereignty of the Monarch and his special prerogatives over 
the executive, legislative and judicial wings as the supreme head have 
been handed over to us by the tradition and custom of the country. For 
some time these prerogatives of the Monarch were exercised by the prime 
ministers by virtue of the rights vested in them by our illustrious 
forefathers. Since those rights were ended by the proclamation of 18 
February 1951, the supreme authority in all affairs now rests in us.114 
 
The rift among and within the political parties (most importantly the NC) emboldened the 
king to strengthen his position.115 Because of this, according to Einsiedel, Malone, and 
Pradhan there was a delay in holding an election.116 This power-centered politics did not 
allow the people’s genuine problems related to health, education, and development to be 
solved.  
 Nepal’s First Parliamentary Elections 3.
As democracy was new to the country, the people’s hope in political parties 
remained strong. Although it took eight years, the Nepalese people’s optimistic belief in 
democracy was crucial to make the country’s first parliamentary election on February 18, 
1959 successful.117  The election result changed the political equation of the country. 
112 Rose and Scholz, Nepal: Profile of a Himalayan Kingdom, 46–48. 
113 Sebastian von Einsiedel, David M. Malone, and Suman Pradhan, Nepal in Transition: From 
People’s War to Fragile Peace (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 6.    
114 Parajulee, The Democratic Transition in Nepal, 42.  
115 Ibid., 41.    
116 Einsiedel, Malone, and Pradhan, Nepal in Transition, 6.  
117  Ibid. 
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Political parties who struggled against the Rana oligarchy were coming into Nepalese 
politics through the consent of the people. Singh highlights that the NC won an 
overwhelming majority in the parliament, winning 74 of 109 seats, with the Gorkha 
Parishad party winning 19, and the Communist Party of Nepal winning only four seats 
(see Table 1).118  
Table 1.   First Parliamentary Election Result of Nepal 1959119 
S.N. Name of Parties Seats Contested     Seats won No of votes PC or % 
1 Nepali Congress 108 74 66,6898 37.2 
2 Gorkha Parishad 86 19 30,511 17.3 
3 Samyukta Prajatantra 
party 
86 5 17,7508 9.9 
4 Nepal Communist Party 47 4 12,9142 7.2 
5 Praja Parishad 
(Acharya) 
46 2 53,083 2.2 
6 Praja Parishad  
(Misha’s) 
36 1 59,820 2.3 
7 Nepal Tarai Congress 21 0 36,107 2.1 
8 Nepal Rastriya Congress 20 0 12,707 0.7 
9 Prajatantrik Mahasabha 68 0 59,896 3.3 
10 Independents 268 4 29,1149 16.7 
 
Table 1 reveals that in the short span of eight years, many political parties 
emerged in Nepalese politics. It also hints that for a country like Nepal, it would not have 
been easy to have a stable political situation with so many political parties and their 
various agendas. Understandably, the future of democracy in Nepal after the election 
seemed more challenging. 
The election results did not please the king; as Singh recounts, the first elected 
Prime Minister of Nepal, B.P. Koirala, announced during his election rally that upon his 
118 Singh, Nepal: Struggle for Democracy, 27.   
119 Ibid., 98. 
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party’s victory in the election he would keep the “crown in the national museum.”120 
Amid this tension with the king, and with so many different political parties jockeying for 
influence, the Nepali Congress government found it hard to implement reforms.121 Rose 
and Scholz explains that the NC appointed its own members to a parallel “development 
bureaucracy” that channeled development funds directly to the districts, bypassing the 
controls of entrenched central bureaucrats,122 who mostly were loyal to the palace.  
Besides social reforms agenda, according to Rose and Scholz, the NC party after 
coming to power focused on keeping administrative officials away from the palace.123 
Those moves were initiated in an effort to curtail the intervening role of palace in 
Nepalese politics and to promote a democratic system in which bureaucrats would be 
accountable towards the people.124 Decisions related to social and bureaucratic reforms 
were not becoming as popular as expected, partly because they were new trends in the old 
system and mostly because those people who were benefitting from old feudalistic social 
status for centuries were losing their privileges. Hence, the first democratically elected 
government of Nepal did not have a smooth governing environment. Parajulee asserts 
that the government’s decision was not liked by powerful groups in society, namely the 
Ranas, the landlords, and Birta holders (feudal proprietors).125  
Although the reforms of the government aimed to bring about changes in people’s 
lives, the reforms provoked violence and lawlessness.126 Moreover, Singh posits that the 
NC party workers at ground level were also not satisfied with their party center.127 Three 
opposition parties—Nepal Praja Parishad (NPP), the united Democratic Party (UDP), and 
the Prajatantrik Mahashaba (PM)—decided to form a National Democratic Forum.128 
120 Ibid., 99.   
121 Singh, Nepal: Struggle for Democracy, 99–103. 
122 Rose and Scholz, Nepal: Profile of a Himalayan Kingdom, 48.  
123 Ibid.   
124 Ibid., 48–49. 
125 Parajulee, The Democratic Transition in Nepal, 41.  
126 Ibid., 48. 
127 Singh, Nepal: Struggle for Democracy, 100. 
128 Ibid., 99.    
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Under such circumstances, the first elected government was facing challenges from 
within and outside the party.  
As Singh outlines, using the fluid political situation after Nepal’s first 
parliamentary election, King Mahendra on December 15, 1960, “dismissed the elected 
government, banned political parties, and deprived the citizens on their fundamental 
rights and freedom, including the elected Prime Minister B. P. Koirala in prison.”129 With 
this event, Nepal’s first-ever parliamentary election and its brief democratic practices 
were abruptly ended with a royal takeover in 1960. 
C. DEMOCRATIC STRUGGLES UNDER PARTY-LESS SYSTEM 
The party-less Panchayat system imposed by the king in 1960 was a major 
setback to the democracy of Nepal.130 Singh writes that there were two years of direct 
rule from the king before promulgation of a new constitution in 1962.131 Narayan Khadka 
asserts that it incorporated “odd but ingenious combination of certain features of the 
National Guidance Systems of Egypt and Indonesia, [and] the Basic Democracy system 
in Pakistan.”132 The king, according to Singh, denounced the weakness of party politics 
and the parliament and he argued that his imposed political system in the country was 
meant for a suitable political system.133 The king’s new ruling system did not give any 
space to the opposition, making the system undemocratic. Sumit Ganguly and Brian 
Shoup maintain that the “four-tiered Panchayat system was little more than a quasi-
democratic front meant to boost the legitimacy of monarchy.”134 This arrangement 
ultimately strengthened the palace power as well.  
129 Singh, Nepal: Struggle for Democracy, 102.    
130 Parajulee, The Democratic Transition in Nepal, 50. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Khadka, “Crisis in Nepal’s Partyless Panchayat System,” 434.  
133 Parajulee, The Democratic Transition in Nepal, 51.  
134 Sumit Ganguly and Brian Shoup, “Nepal: Between Dictatorship and Anarchy,” Journal of 
Democracy 16, no. 4 (2005): 132, doi:10.1353/jod.2005.0062; 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/jod/summary/v016/16.4ganguly.html  
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Although the Panchayat system had a provision of electing its representatives in 
various tiers of its system, according to Khadka, it could not be counted as a democratic 
step because it provided an extremely narrow base of popular representation.135 
Moreover, even the elected representatives were not accountable to the people and to the 
norms of democracy, but rather were loyal to the palace. Ganguly and Shoup go on to say 
that the king had given discretionary authority to suspend the basic law and take over 
cabinet posts.136  
Ganguly and Shoup maintain that the Panchayat system tried to improve the 
country’s overall development by introducing some more land reforms than the NC had 
tried in the past and by making hill people migrate to the flatland Terai.137 However, the 
resentment of people toward the system was at its peak because popular aspirations for 
democracy were increasing. Furthermore, King Birendra, who succeeded his father King 
Mahendra in 1972, had been expected to bring some democratic changes. However, no 
substantial changes in the ruling system materialized.138  
To make things worse, Nepalese students could not submit to the Pakistan 
Embassy in Nepal their letters denouncing Pakistan’s military rulers’ decision to execute 
democratically elected Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan.139 The protest was 
disrupted by police. In response, the students prolonged their protest throughout the 
nation. Rose and Scholz assert that the protest that was meant to denounce Pakistan’s 
regime decision persuaded the general public, peasants, and professionals of Nepal to join 
the anti-government movement.140  
Obviously, irrespective of the agenda or issues, people were waiting for the 
opportunity to express their growing resentment against the Panchayat system. The 
135 Khadka,”Crisis in Nepal’s Partyless Panchayat System,” 434. 
136 Ganguly and Shoup, “Nepal: Between Dictatorship and Anarchy,” 132. 
137 Ibid. 
138 Rose and Scholz, Nepal: Profile of a Himalayan Kingdom, 62–63.   
139 Parajulee, The Democratic Transition in Nepal, 58. 
140 Rose and Scholz, Nepal: Profile of a Himalayan Kingdom, 66.   
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movement gave impetus to the national political movement. Ultimately, the King 
announced a public referendum for 1980.141  
The announcement of a public referendum was welcomed by the political parties 
also as a move to establish good relations between the palace and the parties.142 
According to Urmila Phadnis, the referendum asked people to “choose between two 
alternatives—retention of the ‘partyless’ Panchayat system with suitable reforms or a 
multiparty system of government.”143 Phadnis continues that King Birendra, educated in 
the West, was regarded as more liberal than his father, who had dismissed the elected 
parliament and taken over power.144 Leaders belonging to both camps—that is, followers 
of the Panchayat system and followers of democracy—strengthened their positions by 
attracting people to vote in their favor. A matter of prestige for both sides, the referendum 
was held with a lot of excitement and supposedly in a democratic way.  
In total, 66.9 percent of the population took part.145 The referendum result went in 
favor of Panchayat; as Khadka explains, it proclaimed that people wanted to retain the 
Panchayat system with suitable reforms.146 While alleging that the Panchayat system 
used government resources to win the referendum, opposition parties conceded the 
defeat.147 Singh asserts that the result of the referendum compelled the king to realize the 
necessity of making some changes in the governing system of Panchayat after the 
election.148 As translated by Singh, the king maintained that ideological differences are 
natural for the development of democracy and hinted at the necessity of abiding by the 
decision of a majority alongside respecting the ideas of the minority.149  
141 Ibid. 
142 Parajulee, The Democratic Transition in Nepal, 60.   
143 Urmila Phadnis, “The Politics of Referendum,” Pacific Affairs 54, no.3 (Autumn 1981): 439, 
www.jstor.org/stable/2756788. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Ibid., 444.  
146 Khadka, “Crisis in Nepal’s Partyless Panchayat System,” 440. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Singh, Nepal: Struggle for Democracy, 144.  
149 Ibid. 
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The outcome of the referendum had crucial implications for Nepalese politics. 
First, according to Phadnis, leaders of the Panchayat system, including the king, for the 
first time realized that they could not ignore the minority vote.150 Second, opposition 
parties were able to figure out their political strength and weakness in the country.151 
Hence, both the king with the governing party and the opposition parties were more 
focused on consolidating their power than on developing or establishing democracy in the 
country. As a result, there was a continuation of power-centered politics in the country 
that had started right after the unification of modern Nepal.152 Even though the 
referendum was meant to mend the sour relationship between followers and opponents of 
the Panchayat system, it only widened the rift between the two sides.153  
Throughout the 1980s, the ruling party tried to pacify the multiparty supporters. In 
contrast, the opposition parties (mainly the Nepali Congress and the Communist parties) 
focused on expanding their influence all over the country, creating a favorable situation 
for strong opposition to the ruling parties.154 The country once again saw the power 
struggle in its top-level politics. As a result, political division further deepened in Nepal, 
eventually increasing the people’s grievances. 
Under such circumstances, an underground political movement in the country 
against the Panchayat system gained momentum.155 Moreover, people were frustrated by 
the system. Most importantly, Khadka posits that many newly elected members of 
Panchayat parliament in 1986 showed their “opposition to the system and wanted change 
in Panchayat system.”156 In February 1990, the Nepali Congress and the United Left 
Front (ULF) jointly launched a “United National People’s Movement (UNPM)”157 to 
restore multiparty democracy in the country. The intensity of the UNPM engulfed the 
150 Phadnis, “The Politics of Referendum,” 451. 
151 Ibid., 447. 
152 Singh, Nepal: Struggle for Democracy, 147–148. 
153 Parajulee, The Democratic Transition, 63.  
154 Singh, Nepal: Struggle for Democracy, 151. 
155 Parajulee, The Democratic Transition in Nepal, 63. 
156 Khadka, “Crisis in Nepal’s Partyless Panchayat System,” 453. 
157 Parajulee, The Democratic Transition in Nepal, 75.  
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whole nation. As a result, King Birendra invited opposition leaders to form a new 
cabinet. In this way, 30 years of direct rule by the monarch and the party-less Panchayat 
system were ended by a popular movement.158  
D. UNSTABLE DEMOCRACY AFTER 1990  
After the long period of absolutism in the country, the parliamentary election of 
1991 changed the political equation of the country.159 Thapa explains that the Nepali 
Congress won a majority, the Unified Marxist Leninist (UML) party became the second 
largest party, and the Rastriya Prajatantra Party (loyal to King) was almost eliminated, 
with the biggest surprise of Unified People’s Front Nepal (UPFN, which later became the 
Communist Party of Nepal) emerged as the strong party.160 Even after the 1991 
parliamentary elections, however, the political parties could not put aside their respective 
partisan interests; rather, they continued to promote power-centered politics. As Parajulee 
notes, the expectations of the people and the maintenance of democratic practices were 
shredded away by frequent forming and dissolution the governments.161  
Einsiedel, Malone, and Pradhan further maintain that the collapse of the NC-led 
majority government turned out to be a political misfortune for the country in 1994.162 
The country faced economic burdens during the mid-term election the same year. 
However, no political parties secured a majority in the election, and the CPN (UML), 
being the largest party in the parliament, formed the first elected communist government 
in the Nepalese history.163 As a result, in the four and a half years after the mid-term 
election, Nepal had four unstable governments.164 This situation indicated that people’s 
demands and expectations for better lives never become the necessity of the government 
and political parties. In contrast, power-centered politics became the dominant factor. 
158 Parajulee, The Democratic Transition in Nepal , 92–93. 
159 Ibid. 
160 Thapa and Sijapati, A Kingdom Under Siege, 37.   
161 Parajulee, The Democratic Transition in Nepal, 272. 
162 Ibid. 
163 Thapa and Sijapati, A Kingdom under Siege, 39.     
164 Parajulee, The Democratic Transition in Nepal, 286. 
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Deepak Thapa illustrate that the power-centered trend was so overwhelming that just four 
years after restoration of democracy through the people’s movement, public faith in 
democracy itself eroded.165  
Indeed, the political parties, according to Parajulee, were so eager to either 
maintain their hold on power or to pull down the ruling minority or coalition government 
that they even sought help from the king and the Supreme Court to strengthen their 
position.166 There was no question of government or political parties’ seriousness about 
the genuine problems or concerns of the people, let alone institutionalizing democracy. 
The popular enthusiasm for democratic reform was dashed when the people’s hopes for a 
better standard of living and solutions to Nepal’s entrenched social problems remained 
unfulfilled. 
E. CONCLUSION 
From 1951 to 1990, Nepal experienced many political challenges. In fact, all 
these challenges had one thing in common: power-centered politics that failed to deliver 
services to the people. Although the monarchy was strongly blamed for deteriorating the 
political situation of the country, political parties and their leaders also have to concede 
some part of blame for not being able to show leadership when it was needed. Especially 
after the dawn of democracy in Nepal in 1951, political parties and their leaders could 
neither develop solidarity among themselves for the welfare of the country nor 
institutionalize the democratic norms while running the government.  
Monarchs used the political parties’ weaknesses as an opportunity to strengthen 
their positions in Nepalese politics. The power-centered politics of Nepal for relatively 
long periods of time (even after the end of the Rana oligarchy) disrupted Nepal’s social, 
political, and economic dimensions. In the course of all these activities, the Nepalese 
people and their expectations were never addressed.  
165 Deepak Thapa, “The Making of the Maoist Insurgency,” in Nepal in Transition:  From People’s 
War to Fragile Peace, ed. Einsiedel, Malone, and Pradhan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 
48. 
166 Parajulee, The Democratic Transition in Nepal, 286.  
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The continuation of such practices eventually created a situation where the 
political stakeholders (mainly the king and the political parties) completely shifted their 
focuses from responsibility for delivering services to the people to concentrating on 
strengthening their political aims. As a result of a deeply entrenched people’s grievance 
against political parties and a frustration with democracy, a revolutionary mindset 
developed in Nepal. Most importantly, those people who had to face social discrimination 
based on religion, language, and caste were increasingly prepared to side with any 
movement or agenda that provided them any hope to rid the country of such insufferable 
practices.   
 30 
III. ETHNIC GRIEVANCES IN NEPALESE POLITICS 
 
The ethnic issue in Nepal has a long history. However, as Susan Hangen asserts, 
Nepal has never experienced open ethnic conflict even though it is home to more than 
100 ethnic and caste groups.167 The main concern of the ethnic community has always 
revolved around being represented in national politics. Therefore, at present, the legacy 
of ethnic issues in Nepal prevails more as a political problem than a social one.  
Hence, while analyzing how ethnic issues emerged in national politics, this 
chapter highlights historical ramifications, ethnic issues in Nepalese politics, political 
ignorance to ethnic grievances and its possible future, and ethnic issues in Nepalese 
democracy. To further maintain that ethnic issues are politically driven, the interim 
constitution of Nepal includes clauses to ensure that there shall be equal justice, rights, 
and opportunity to all citizens with no discrimination:  
No person shall, on the ground of caste, descent, community or 
occupation, be subject to racial discrimination and untouchability of any 
form. Such a discriminating act shall be liable to punishment and the 
victim shall be entitled to the compensation as provided by the law.
168
 
Likewise, in order to uplift the social status of low caste or historically under-privileged 
people, the interim constitution also aspires to such points that  
women, Dalit, indigenous tribes, Madheshi community, oppressed group, 
the poor peasant and labourers, who are economically, socially or 
educationally backward, shall have the right to participate in the state 
mechanism on the basis of proportional inclusive principles.
169
  
Constitutional ideals notwithstanding, however, society has not easily accepted 
such provisions. As a result, there are many cases—mostly in remote parts of Nepal—
where social exclusion of the low-caste people or ethnicities persist. Hangen provides 
167 Hangen, The Rise of Ethnic Politics, 25.  
168 The Government of Nepal, Interim Constitution (2007),8. 
http://www.nepal.gov.np/NepalGEAPortalp=WebContent/NLC&n=InterimConstitutionOfNepal.html   
169 Ibid.,11.  
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examples that the low-caste people are not allowed to enter high-caste people’s homes or 
share meal with them.170 Furthermore, in Nepal, various ethnic groups have their own 
internal caste system. For example, Newars, Gurungs, Rai, Magars, and Madeshi are 
some of the distinct ethnic groups having their own caste system. Table 2 illustrates some 
of the subdivisions among the ethnic Newari.  
Table 2.   Religion-Based Newari Ethnicity and Its Internal Caste System171 
Buddhist Newars Hindu Newars 
Gubhaju  (priests) 
Bare (inferior priests and gold- and silver-smiths) 
Deo Brahman (priests) 
Jha Brahman (inferior priests) 
Sheshyo (landowners and 
farmers) 
Sheshyo Chhathari  
Sheshyo Panchthari 
Sheshyo Charthari 
Jyapu (peasants and agricultural laborers)  
Regarded as untouchable Regarded as touchable 
 
In the Newars’ case, although various castes follow traditional Newar character, 
being a different caste group they also have their own norms and values. For example, the 
Jyapu (peasants and agricultural laborers) belonging to Buddhism do not have the same 
privileges and are not considered to be high-caste Newars like Sheshyo (landowners and 
farmers). It also signifies that it is difficult to change the deeply entrenched, age-old 
social practices and traditions. Because of such complexities, the ethnic and caste issues 
in Nepal have been always contentious.172   
170 Hangen, The Rise of Ethnic Politics, 27.  
171 Christoph von Fürer-Haimendorf, “The Inter-Relations of Castes and Ethnic Groups in Nepal,” 
Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 20, no. 1/3 (1957): 245. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/610377. 
172 Hangen, The Rise of Ethnic Politics, 2–3. 
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A. ETHNICITY IN NEPAL UNTIL 1990 
Historically, Nepal’s ethnic issues can be considered to reach back to the 
existence of Hindu mythologies. Hindu mythology was deeply integrated with social 
practices, which segregated people based on castes. Marie Lecomte-Tilouine illuminates 
the impact of Hinduism on ethnic issues and its segregation:  
Hindu mythology shows that the uniqueness of the primordial being, 
Purusha, was broken at the creation of the universe, when his body was 
dismembered to create, from its different parts the classes of human being. 
These classes are ranked in a hierarchy according to their correspondence 
to various parts of Purasha’s anatomy enumerated in vertical order: thus, 
Brahmins, who emerged from his mouth, form the highest category, 
Kshatriyas, who came from his chest, are ranked second, Vaishyas, who 
originated from this thighs, are ranked third, and last come the Shudras, 
who emerged from his feet.173 
It was a traditional belief in Hindu religion that purusha (meaning “men” in the 
Sanskrit language, which is the original script of modern-day Nepalese), alongside the 
creation of Universe, were meant to perform their responsibilities based on their castes, 
that is, “Kshatriyas, Vaishyas, shudras, Brahmins.”174 These categories gave different 
identities to different people. For example, the Brahmins were considered to be a sacred 
caste, with most of them as priests. Likewise, Shudras would be considered a low-caste 
people like shoemakers, or blacksmiths. The lowest of the low-caste were considered 
“untouchable.”  
Untouchability refers to certain practices of the “upper” castes such as 
refusing to touch or share water with people who have been called the 
“untouchables” and who are today collectively called dalits. These sets of 
practices involve not only proscriptions on both groups of people but are 
often justified through notions of purity and related concepts.175 
 
173Lecomte-Tilouine, Hindu Kingship, Ethnic Revival, 194. 
174 Ibid. 
175 Sundar Sarukkai, “Phenomenology of Untouchability,” Economic and Political Weekly, 44, No. 
37, 39, http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/25663542?sid=21105755096313&uid=4&uid=2  
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 Ethnic Issues in Nepalese Politics  1.
As noted by Sundar Sarukkai, Nepalese society was similarly divided  into elite-
caste groups and lower-caste as untouchable groups, even though society was uniformly 
Hindu. Likewise, as Hangen notes, even before the unification of Nepal,  high-caste 
Hindus were already able to exert a significant level of influence in the Nepalese politics 
during the 18th century.176 However, Nepal’s ethnic issues became more pressing after 
1769.  
It is not an overstatement that the ethnic issues in Nepal were present at the 
creation of a unified Nepal. Tilouine mentions that the national unifier, King Prithvi 
Narayan Shah, compared Nepal to a common flower garden with four classes (Varna) 
and 36 classes (jat).177 This poetic pronouncement was meant to unite the different castes 
and classes under one flag. Hangen posits that as the unification campaign started “the 
process of state building resulted in ethnic stratification as different groups of people 
were incorporated in the state on unequal terms.”178 As time passed, the caste system 
deepened, and began to create social discrimination in Nepalese society. 
In addition, because of the influence in the state’s affairs, the high-caste Hindus 
were able to establish a good relationship with the rulers as well as being able to get 
benefits from the emergent state.179 Therefore, Hangen writes, in Nepalese history, “the 
process of state formation benefited high-caste Hindus, some Newars and some other 
ethnic groups”180—but not all. Under these circumstances, a strong anti-regime 
perception among the lower-caste people prevailed even during the Shah rule in Nepal, 
however latent this sentiment remained in an age of extremely limited popular political 
activity. 
Similarly, Thapa assert that the originator of Rana oligarchy rule, Jung Bahadur 
Rana, played an active role to promulgate the “Hindu caste system through 1854 Muluki 
176 Hangen, The Rise of Ethnic Politics, 28. 
177 Lecomte-Tilouine, Hindu Kingship, Ethnic Revival, 82. 
178 Hangen, The Rise of Ethnic Politics, 28.  
179 Ibid  
180 Ibid.  
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Ain (Civil code) … [it] divided the entire population of Nepal into a rigid social pecking 
order based on caste and ethnicity.”181The Rana rulers always had a focus to 
“institutionalize Hinduism and Nepali as the official religion and language of the 
state.”182 In the long run, this situation marginalized other religions and languages of 
Nepal, and widened the rift among the various castes. 
Hangen, notes that during the Rana regime, the rumble over ethnic issues in Nepal 
continued in the form of “cultural preservation and revitalization.”183 This is how the 
decades-long history of conflict between specific ethnic community and the Nepali state 
have emerged in social and political forms.184  
By the beginning of the 1900s, some events demonstrated the politicization of 
social discrimination in Nepal. The Limbus, who resided in hilly eastern districts of 
Nepal as Brown explains were concerned by the dominance of Brahmins, which were in 
the minority in the areas of Limbus yet controlled economy and social positions.185 
Hangen mentions that during 1920s, 1930s and 1940s, notably, the Newars, living in the 
Kathmandu Valley started various activities to promote their language.186  
Likewise, Nancy Levine says, other castes like Tamang, Limbu, Rai, and Gurung 
had an “intrinsic and enduring identity”187 in terms of their customs and languages. In 
1949, another specific group from Tharus (although they live in flatland, they do not 
consider themselves as Madhesi) communities established Tharu Kalyankari Sabha 
(Tharu Welfare Society).188 Similarly, other ethnic organizations were also established as 
welfare societies, like Thakali Samaj Sudhar Sangh (Social Reform Organisation) in 
181 Thapa, “The Making of the Maoist insurgency,” 39–40. 
182 Thapa, “The Making of the Maoist Insurgency,” 39.   
183 Susan Hangen, Creating a “New Nepal”: The Ethnic Dimension (Washington, DC: East-West 
Center, 2007), 15, http://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/handle/10125/3513/ps034.pdf.  
184 Ibid., 14.  
185 Brown, The Challenge to Democracy, 4.  
186 Hangen, Creating a “New Nepal,” 15. 
187 Nancy E. Levine, “Caste, State and Ethnic Boundaries in Nepal,” The Journal of Asian Studies 46, 
no. 1 (February 1987), 74, http://www.Jstor.org/stable/2056667.  
188 Hangen, The Rise of Ethnic Politics, 35. 
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1954.189 Thakali, according to Menzardo and Sharma are people from Thak khola or 
river.190 These activities demonstrate that people belonging to some particular groups or 
communities were concerned with preserving, if not promoting, their ethnic identity. 
 Ethnic Movements from 1951 to 1990 2.
Ethnic issues in Nepal broke through into political prominence only with the fall 
of the Rana regime and the beginning of democracy in 1951.191 People were not only 
against the Rana oligarchy but also expected social welfare activities that could end 
social discrimination.192 Even though the ethnic movements after 1951 were not so 
effective as to make any substantial changes in the age-old ethnic problem of Nepal, they 
did spur the ethnic communities to rise for their rights and freedom.193  
Hangen posits that because of the awareness within ethnic community on their 
rights, “in the early 1950s there were acts of violence against Bahuns”194 (Bahuns are 
Hindu-high caste) in eastern Nepal. The struggle or the violent activities of Limbus 
against Bahuns were considered an effort to retrieve their special land rights they had 
enjoyed for so many years before.195 Even though the Bahun [Hindu-high caste) money-
lenders were harassed and beaten, there was no large-scale violence based on the ethnic 
issues.196  
To be sure, the ethnic issues in Nepal were politically amplified when 
organizations affiliated with underprivileged ethnic communities formed coalitions.197 
189 Hangen, Creating a “New Nepal,” 16.  
190 Andrew. E. Menzardo and Keshav Prashad Sharma, “Cost-Cutting Caste and Community: A 
Look at Thakali Social Reform in Pokhara,” Contributions to Nepalese Studies 2, no. 2 (1975): 25–26, 
http://himalaya.socanth.cam.ac.uk/collections/journals/contributions/pdf/CNAS_02_02_02.pdf.   
191 Hangen, Creating a “New Nepal,” 15. 
192 Singh, Nepal Struggle for Democracy, 60–61. 
193 Hangen, Creating a “New Nepal,” 14–16. 
194 Ibid., 15.  
195 Ibid., 14–15. 
196 Ibid. 
197 Ibid., 14–16. 
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Therefore, the ethnic grievances that “challenged the hegemonic ethnic domination of the 
[high-caste] in state and society,”198 became stronger after 1990.  
B. ETHNIC MOVEMENTS AFTER 1990 
With the restoration of democracy alongside the downfall of party-less Panchayat 
system, long-neglected ethnic issues and grievances become prominent in Nepalese 
politics. The demands for the ethnic rights according to Hangen, emerged strongly in the 
form of “indigenous nationalities movement.”199 Bhattachan maintain that even after the 
promulgation of 1990 constitution since Nepal still remained as a Hindu Kingdom, which 
further increased ethnic communities’ grievances against the government as “ethnic and 
region-based organizations and political parties continued to pursue their demands.”200 
Such a situation occurred because in Hindu religion nothing has changed as far as the 
discriminatory activities toward lower-caste Hindus and non-Hindus was concerned. For 
example, both the lower-caste Hindus and non-Hindus would not be allowed to enter any 
Hindu temple  
Thus, in practice, as Lawoti notes, the ethnic communities like Dalits, Janajatis 
(indigeneous people), and Madeshis (people living in flatland or madhesh), who 
experienced social inequalities and discrimination for long periods of time, did not see 
any considerable changes in their position even after 1990.201  
198 Mahendra Lawoti, “ Ethnic Politics and the Building of an Inclusive State,” in Nepal in Transition:  
From People’s War to Fragile Peace, ed. Einsiedel, Malone, and Pradhan (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 129. 
199 Hangen, The Rise of Ethnic Politics, 37.  
200 Krishna B. Bhattachan, “Ethnopolitics and ethnodevelopment: An emerging paradigm in Nepal” in   
Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nepal: Identities and Mobilization after 1990, ed. Mahendra Lawoti 
and Susan Hangen (New York and London: Routledge, 2013), 39.  
201 Mahendra Lawoti, “Evolution and growth of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal” in The Maoist 
Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century, ed. Mahendra Lawoti and Anup Pahari 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2010), 10–11. 
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 Dalits 1.
As Anita Shrestha writes, Dalits are the low-caste Hindu people.202 In Nepal’s 
total population Dalits are believed to comprise 13.09 percent.203 While Dalits are 
dispersed nationwide, the majority of them reside in the middle hills and some in the 
flatland as well. Lawoti and Hangen assert that Damai (tailors), Kami (smiths), Sarki 
(leatherworkers), and Gandharba (minstrels) are the most prominent Dalits.204  
The discrimination against Dalits was so high that their physical touch was 
regarded as misfortune to persons, animals, or even belongings of high-caste people. In 
the past, the practice of social boycott was common against Dalit men and women in 
Nepal. For example, if a Dalit girl would marry a high-caste man or vice-versa,205 the 
couple would be excluded from the society and also from their families. If a family did 
not shun the couple, the family also faced exclusion and discrimination.  
Today such practices are illegal in Nepal, but there are places where the boycott 
still happens. At present, if a Dalit would walk in to the temple or be a part of any 
religious ceremony or a Dalit girl or boy would marry high-caste boy or girl, they may be 
socially ignored even though politically such actions are punishable.206  
 Indigenous Groups or Adhibasi Janajatis 2.
Indigenous groups (Adhibasi Janajati in the Nepalese language) have a huge say 
in the issue of ethnicity in Nepalese politics. Lawoti note that the indigenous groups 
represent separate culture, castes, and religion.207  Among many Tamus, Magars, Rai, 
Limbu, Tamang, Tharu are some of the prominent castes among indigenous groups of 
202 Anita Shrestha, “Dalits in Nepal: Story of Discrimination,” FOCUS  30 (2002), 1, 
http://lighthousenepal.org/about/dalit-caste.pdf.  
203 Ibid.  
204 Steven Folmar, “Problems of identity for Hill Dalits and Nepal’s nationalist project,” in 
Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nepal: Identities and Mobilization after 1990, ed. Mahendra Lawoti 
and Susan Hangen (New York and London: Routledge, 2013), 87.  
205 Shrestha, “Dalits in Nepal.” 
206 The Government of Nepal, Interim Constitution (2007),8. 
207 Lawoti, “Ethnic Politics,” 130–31.  
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Nepal.208 These people are scattered all over the country. Besides, Newars and Tharus, 
most of other castes live in the hill districts of Nepal.  
 Madheshi  3.
Madeshi are the people living in the flatland of Nepal also known as Madhesh or 
Terai, who share language, culture and traditions with the people from North India.209 
Krishna Hachhethu maintains that the Madhesh begins from Siwalik” hill range, and 
Madesh identity is mostly used for people in that region.210 Furthermore, he states that 
there is no documented “Pan-Madesh identity” in terms of culture, religion and 
language.211 For this reason and other social conventions, some Janajatis group like 
Tharu do not prefer to recognized as Madeshis although they reside mostly in the flat 
lands of Nepal.212  
C. POLITICAL DISREGARD OF ETHNIC GRIEVANCES 
Hachhetchu argues that, with the political shift in 1990, the ethnic communities 
demanded more inclusion, better representation, and a more responsive central 
government.213 Likewise, Hangen asserts that ethnic communities wanted the state to 
“recognize and support their cultural diversities.”214 However, because all the parties 
were new to democratic practices, and because of the overwhelming focus on party 
politics, political parties could not address the issue of ethnic grievances. The continued 
prevalence of suppressed people, groups, and languages in Nepal remained key to the 
deterioration of ethnic issues in Nepalese politics that further provoked ethnic grievances. 
Table 3, from the World Bank, illustrates this point.  
208 Lawoti, “Ethnic Politics,” 134. 
209 Ibid., 131. 
210 Krishna Hachhethu, “Madheshi Nationalism and Restructuring the Nepali State,” paper presented 
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Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu, 2007, 4.  
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Gender Caste Ethnicity/Race Language  Religion Geo-
political 
Dominant  Men/Boys Tagadhari 
Brahmin 
Chettris 













Almost none the governments formed from 1991 to 1994 could satisfy the 
demands of ethnic communities. Deepak Thapa explains that even though political parties 
campaigned on promises to improve the conditions of people, especially the ethnic 
communities, “there was no improvement in the socio-economic conditions of the 
people.”216 Anne Sales recounts that not even a single candidate representing any ethnic 
communities won an election held between 1991 and 1994.217  
This situation could have given the wrong impression to other political parties that 
besides indigenous people, the majority of the population did not consider ethnic issues 
as a crucial agenda item for the country. Sales maintains that people were more interested 
in solving their social necessities (food, health, education, etc.) than in indulging in ethnic 
issues for their own sake.218 However, almost all the political parties outlined their 
concern for respecting cultural diversity of ethnic communities and giving special rights 
for their preservation in their respective party’s manifesto.  
215 The World Bank, Department for International Development, “Unequal Citizens: Gender, Caste, 
and Ethnic Exclusion in Nepal,” 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEV/Resources/3177394-
1168615404141/NepalGSEASummaryReport-part1.pdf. 
216 Thapa and Sijapati, A Kingdom under Siege, 55.  
217 Anne de Sales, “The Kham Magar Country, Nepal: Between Ethnic Claims and Maoism,” in 
Understanding the Maoist Movement of Nepal, ed. Deepak Thapa (Kathmandu: Martin Chautari, 2003), 71.  
218 Ibid.  
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When the major parties like the NC and the CPN (UML) came to power, 
however, their manifestos were never executed on ground.219 After 1990, political 
ignorance of issues related to ethnic grievances continued for several years in Nepalese 
politics. Hence, a separate analysis on the political ignorance to Dalits, Janajatis and 
Madeshes gives clear reasons to understand as to how their grievances against the ruling 
system kept on increasing.  
 Disregard of Dalit Issues 1.
As opposed to the promises given to the Dalits for improving their conditions, 
almost all the political parties after 1990 did not do much to on this regard. The 
representation of Dalit’s in the parliament was either zero or negligible.220 Hence, Folmar 
note that all political parties offered fish to the Dalits but gave them frog in reality—
meaning that Dalits were promised political inclusion but in fact they continued to face 
discrimination.221 Such discrimination and the ignorance of political parties for not to 
include any Dalits in the cabinet from 1990 to 2002 increased Dalits’ grievances.222  
 Disregard of Janajatis 2.
For decades the resentment of indigenous groups existed over the issue of an 
unequal distribution of state facilities as well as representation of their castes. David 
Gellner ascertains that because Nepal did not have reservation facilities like in India, it 
could not equally offer opportunities (most importantly education) and share 
developmental facilities to the under privileged people living in different parts of the 
country.223 Gellner further suggests that the government facilities would be offered to 
people who had traditionally enjoyed either high-caste status like Brahmins and Chettris 
or some “principally high-caste elite group even from indigenous group like Newars.”224 
219 Parajulee, The Democratic Transition, 290–292. 
220 Lawoti, “Ethnic Politics,” 140. 
221 Folmar, “Problems of identity for Hill Dalits,” 85.  
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Therefore, the issue of Janajatis or indigenous has become contentious as all Janajatis 
settlers did not migrate in Nepal at the same time, some castes like Tamangs are new 
settlers compared to other nonindigenous castes like Brahmins and Chettris.225  
 
 Disregard of Madeshi People 3.
The Madhesi people always felt isolated by the ruling system and discriminated in 
terms of their culture, ethnicity and language. Bandita Sijapati illustrate that as the 
“strong sense of collective deprivation experienced by Madhesis helped form the basis of 
their mobilization as an identity group,”226 the political ignorance of their problem was 
fueling their grievances against the ruling system. 
According to Monica Dastider, at some point people from the hills started to settle 
in the plain terai for better living, yet they were recognized as Pahades (people from hills) 
not Madeshis.227 The Madheshis always felt they were not treated as well as Pahades. 
This sense of rivalry persisted permanently in the hearts and minds of the Madeshi people 
against the Pahades and eventually accumulated in the form of Madeshis grievances. 
Hence, the Madeshis have tendency of counting “Pahades” as only settlers in the plain 
areas, and thus will not give them enough space to let Pahades feel as part of Madeshi 
communities.228  
Still, the Madhesh ethnic issue never surfaced, until there was an overwhelming 
political movement behind it. According to Hachhethu, one of the prominent results of 
the political party’s failure to address the ethnic grievances of Nepal was reflected during 
the 21-day Madesh uprising, in 2007.229 The Madesh uprising is the first uprising in 
225 Hangen, Creating a “New Nepal,” 19. 
226 Bandita Sijapati, “In Pursuit of Recognition: Regionalism, Madeshi Identity and the Madhes 
Andolan,” in  Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nepal: Identities and Mobilization after 1990, ed. 
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229 Hachhethu, “Madeshi Nationalism,” 2.  
 42 
                                                 
Nepalese history that was overwhelmed with the demand for establishing ethnic rights in 
Madhesh. Another important aspect of this uprising is that it took place during January–
Feburary 2007 a year after the Comprehensive Peace Accord between the government 
and the Maoist rebels, which ended 10-year-old Maoist insurgency in Nepal. Sijapati 
argue that the Madheshi, through the Madhesh movement, advocated for recognition not 
just for representation of their ethnicity.230  
According to Hachhethu, the significance of Madhesh uprising was that after 
second people’s movement overthrew the direct rule of the monarch in 2002, governance 
arrangements offered some benefits to Janajatis, women, and Dalits, but they granted 
nothing in the case of Madheshis.231 Therefore, Sijapati highlights that through the 
Madhesh uprising, the Madeshis wanted to establish their position in the Nepalese 
Politics, as “authors of legislative processes not simply addressees of the law.”232 Thus, 
during the Madhesh uprising, activists demanded that all of Madhesh be recognized as 
autonomous region, rather than asking only for the political recognition of their problem.  
The Madesh uprising showed that even the end of insurgency in 2006 could not 
do much to reduce the grievances of Madheshis toward the ruling system. Furthermore, 
the uprising also hinted that a reform of the system or regime itself is not sufficient to 
pacify people’s aspirations and grievances. In fact a concrete plan, tangible benefits and 
efforts should be in place to avoid any conflict, agitation or uprising. Likewise, the 
uprising also pointed that political ignorance to ethnic grievances for longer period of 
time could result into sever uprising. 
In the long run, these varied and entrenched grievances would turn into 
frustration, which remains prone to get either easily swayed or to be exploited by the 
radical reform agenda of the political parties. In the past because of such ethnic 
grievances in the Nepalese politics, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists) easily 
grabbed the opportunity and waged insurgency.233 Therefore, the long disregard of 
230 Sijapati, “In Pursuit of Recognition,” 155.  
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political parties of the ethnic grievances proved costly to Nepal’s social, political and 
economic domain and could again emerge if politically, the issue of ethnic grievances 
will not be addressed correctly.  
D. ETHNIC GRIEVANCES IN THE FUTURE  
The continuation of political disregard of the ethnic problems in Nepal can again 
create an environment for new violence. Compared to other parts of Nepal, it is especially 
vulnerable to erupt in the context of Madesh or Terai region. As Terai shares a porous 
open border with India, cross-border violence is frequent. These probabilities will be 
extremely precarious if they are further fueled by Madhesh ethnic issues.  
Most importantly, as Anurag Acharaya asserts that even after the Comprehensive 
Peace Accord ended the decade-long Maoist insurgency; many armed outfits have sprung 
up in Madhesh.234 One of the reasons, according to Rameshowr Bohora, could be that 
many were doing so to “get back at the Maoists for their actions during the decade-long 
insurgency.”235 Hence, the question remains what would happen if the ethnic grievances 
of people living in various part of the country would follow the course of violence to 
make the state listen their never solved problem.  
Therefore, if the ethnic grievances of the people are not timely addressed then 
another violent activity will occur in the name of revolution, and insurgency. According 
to Bhattachan, failing to address such ethnic grievances the country might face another 
ethnic movement in the form of “reform or revolution.”236 However, the ethnic issues 
cannot be seen only from negative perspectives because this issue somehow has helped to 
strengthen the Nepalese Democracy as well. Unlike in the past, because of various ethnic 
movements, the ethnic issues have been pertinent in Nepal’s present day politics.  
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E. CONCLUSION  
The ethnic issues of Nepal and the movements associated with them have never 
put forth their demands in a violent way. The formation of various political wings 
especially after 1990 has given the forum for the people to speak out their grievances. 
Hangen maintains that because of these kinds of forums, and the continuous political and 
intellectual pressure over the ethnic issues, the government of Nepal in 2002 established 
“official definition of adibasi janajati through the National Foundation for the 
Development of Indigenous Nationalities (NFDIN).”237 This foundation allowed the 
NFDIN to regulate its voice regarding ethnic groups in national affairs.  
For the consolidation of democracy such forums always serve as platforms to 
incorporate differences and allow people to try to find solution remaining in within the 
democratic setup of the country. In a country like Nepal, which has various cultural, 
traditions, and languages, such peaceful practices definitely will help to establish a trend 
of looking to solve the problem through democratic manner.  
Nepal’s early history has incorporated the different dimensions of ethnic issues in 
terms of culture, religion, and tradition. In the past Nepal was isolated from outside 
world. It was ruled by various monarchs, and Ranas who preferred to keep Nepal isolated 
so that their rule would not be challenged with the democratic aspiration of people. 
Therefore, the issue of ethnic grievances never surfaced in the national politics of Nepal. 
Because of such isolation and lack of people’s awareness, it would have been possible 
that at the beginning emerged more as social issues than the political one. As a result 
social discrimination to lower-caste people was severe in the society. The hierarchical 
caste system in terms of caste, religion and language started to become complex. The 
people belonging to the lower-caste not only suffered to bear social discrimination but 
also were compelled to feel as unequal citizens of same nations.  
The discrimination that increased ethnic grievances however, never got 
transformed into a social problem and the country never had to face ethnic conflict. 
However, ethnic issues and grievances started to get politicized over the course of time 
237 Hangen, Creating a “New Nepal,” 15.   
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and started to become the contentious issue in the national politics. Especially, after the 
restoration of multiparty democracy, the interim constitution included special clause to 
address the ethnic grievances. However, irrespective of those constitutional clauses the 
ethnic communities continued to face discrimination resulting to further deepen the 
grievances. The Maoist insurgency amplified the ethnic issues. Because of this, the 
interim constitution of Nepal in 2007 included clause that would consider any 




IV. THE MAOIST MOVEMENT AND ETHNIC GRIEVANCES 
  
Especially in the context of political instability, rampant corruption, ineffective 
government and excessively power-centered party politics, Nepalese people’s resentment 
against the political parties reached an apex after 1990.238 According to Joanna Pfaff-
Czarnecka, this situation contrasted with the people’s aspirations after the restoration of 
democracy in 1990.239 People regarded political parties and the leaders as opportunists.  
As Thapa and Sijapati posits, the marginalized and downtrodden people always 
felt like second-class citizens, and expected fair treatment from the center.240 Similarly, 
Hari Roka mentions that the Nepalese people did not see any serious commitment and 
actions on the part of the political parties including a leftist party such as CPN (UML) to 
solve their problems.241 With the growing resentment toward the political parties, people 
were losing hope and trust in democratic parties as well. This discontent spelled the 
biggest loss for all the political parties of Nepal but one: the CPN (M). Therefore, the 
Maoist movement played a crucial role, as Michael Hutt notes, in changing the political 
and social dynamics of Nepal.242 
The CPN (M) exploited the weaknesses of political parties, and was able to garner 
the sympathy of marginalized people. According to Saubhagya Shah, initially the Maoists 
tried to persuade people with their social reform agendas’ and advocated to establish the 
rights for the marginalized people.243 Therefore, although people belonging to various 
ethnic groups were not joining the Maoist movement, many of them were either 
238 Lawoti, “Evolution and growth of the Maoist insurgency,” 7–11. 
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supporting or recognizing the Maoists’ agendas. Politically, they made for an important 
gain of the Maoist party.  
A. COMMUNISM AND MAOISM IN NEPAL  
In 1949, Pushpa lal Shrestha, Niranjan Govind Vaidya, and other notable leftist 
leaders formed the Communist party of Nepal (CPN) in Kolkata (India) on July 1949.244 
However, R. Nickson asserts that the impact of Communist ideology in Nepalese politics 
began with country’s quest for democracy in 1951.245 For a small landlocked country like 
Nepal, which shares an open border with India and whose economy is heavily dependent 
on its larger neighbor, communism should not have resonated.  
It is often argued that the Communist influence in Nepal increased after it decided 
to open a road network with China in 1963. According to PR Pradhan, refuting the 
allegation that he allowed communist influence in Nepal, the late King Mahendra 
delivered a speech saying “communism will not come to Nepal by riding a vehicle.”246 In 
fact, in Nepal’s case, compared to China, an open border with India and the communist 
movement in its northern states (most importantly the Naxalite communist rebels in West 
Bengal) can be considered to be an influential factor for the rise of Communist ideology. 
Upreti, highlights the significant influence of communism in the Nepalese politics:  
The rise of the communist movement in Nepal is contemporary to the rise 
of organized political activities and political parties in the country. 
Another important aspect is that like the Nepali congress, the Communist 
party of Nepal also emerged in the Indian soil. The Indian National 
Movement along with various social reforms that took place in India from 
time to time provided the necessary background for the emergence of 
organized political activities in Nepal.247  
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According to Lawati, historically, the Communist parties in Nepal have chronic 
problem of “factionalism and frequent splits.”248 Furthermore, Upreti recounts that the 
conflict of CPN with the centrist party like the Nepali congress party started when it 
opposed the “New Delhi agreement concluded between the Nepali Congress, Ranas and 
Monarchy.”249  
The CPN opposition to the agreement signifies that it wanted drastic change in the 
Nepalese politics as opposed to the compromised moderate change adopted by the Nepali 
Congress Party. Upreti maintains that even during that time, some members of the CPN 
agreed to go into a protracted war to the complete political change in the country, while 
some of the party members wanted to side with the democratic forces.250 This situation 
denoted two political implications. First, the difference of opinion over the issue of 
governing models had a distinct line between CPN and other democratic parties 
(especially the Nepali Congress) immediately after country’s independence. Second, 
there were hardline and moderate leaders within the CPN party, and they had differences 
over party policies. Upreti further posits that at times there were communists who despite 
their ideology would support every move of the royal palace, termed as Royal 
Communists.251 Likewise, Lawoti assert that after 1990, communist party, like the CPN 
(UML) that formed the first democratically elected communist government,252 was 
considered as a moderate communist party. In contrast, Upreti notes that there were 
hardline Communists who would want to revamp the old system rather than tackle the 
genuine social and political transformation in the country.253  
In general, Nepalese political history shows that communist parties were divided 
over their ideological stands over different periods of time. Lawoti asserts that when 
communism was declining from world politics, communists in Nepal were able to 
248 Lawoti, “Evolution and growth of the Maoist,” 5. 
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establish themselves as major political force.254 There may be various reasons for it but 
bad governance, disregard of people’s grievances, and extremely unstable and power-
centered politics can be commonly considered a main source of the problem.  
B. GENESIS OF THE MOVEMENT  
The restoration of multiparty democracy in Nepal in 1990 provided a chance for 
various political parties to exercise their activities. Continuing with the trend of many 
breakaways and unity among the different communist parties of Nepal, CPN (Fourth 
Congress), CPN (Mashal) led by Prachanda, and CPN (Masal) led by Baburam Bhattari 
formed the hardcore communists’ center under the name of CPN (Unity Center)/United 
People’s Front Nepal.255 The party impressively won nine seats in the 1991 
parliamentary elections. Thapa argues that as the Party Manifesto of CPN (unity center) 
had opposed the constitution and multiparty democracy, its participation in the election 
was viewed as its strategy to “gain a platform to ‘expose’ the inadequacy of the 
parliamentary system.”256  
Lawati posit that the strategy of the CPN (UC) became more explicit when it 
formed the CPN (Maoist) and “decided to begin armed insurgency.”257 However, one of 
the difficulties for the CPN (M) was to establish themselves as a radical communist party 
with strong social-reformist agendas unlike other communist parties. But according to 
Sudheer Sharma, to the CPN (M) dismay, it was also considered “one of the dozens of 
communist parties that existed in Nepal.”258 Moreover, the government was not serious 
about their movement. Sharma goes on to say that the negligence on part of the 
government was so much that even after the Maoists declared people’s war, the then 
home minister claimed of bringing Maoist “activities under control within four or five 
254 Lawoti, “Evolution and growth of the Maoist,” 5–6. 
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days.”259 Sharma however mentions that as the insurgency intensified by 2001, “every 
word that came from Prachanda attracted tremendous interest and speculations amongst 
all the sections of Nepali Society.”260  
Likewise, before starting their insurgency, the Maoist leader Baburam Bhattarai 
submitted a 40-point conditional demand to then Prime Minister, Sher Bahadur Deuba.261 
Singh mentions that out of many demands, three core demands were the base line of the 
CPN (M) i.e., Interim Constitution, Constitutional Assembly election, and Republic 
Nepal.262 In contrast, the government did not even look at the demands before it flatly 
denied them. Deuba, after six years of Maoist insurgency, as Singh describes, was 
“finding it tough to find way of negotiation with the rebels.”263  
This point in Nepalese politics is often analyzed as the failure by the then-
government to prevent the insurgency. Therefore, there is always a question in Nepalese 
politics: Had the government listened to the Maoist problem, would the Maoists have 
given up insurgency? For various reasons, it was unlikely that Maoists would have done 
so. However, it would have been impossible for the Maoists to continue the insurgency 
had state timely addressed issues related to people’s aspirations, and ethnic issues. 
According to Thapa, the CPN (M) realized that as marginalized people’s 
sentiments were rising, and politically the government was unstable with less 
socioeconomic reform, it was the right time for them to use the people’s grievances to 
achieve their political goal.264 The CPN (M) as a political party always wanted to 
establish as a strong party with their popular demands. The above analysis hints that in 
any situation the insurgency would have taken place in Nepal. However, if the 
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governments at the time had seriously considered the Maoist 40-point demands,265 then 
the Maoists would have had less reason to start the insurgency. 
 Buildup 1.
The Maoist movement that began on February 13, 1996, from six hilly districts of 
Nepal, according to Singh, was able to spread their influence to almost all the country 
within the short period of time.266 They deftly used the political instability of the country 
from 1996 to 2001. Hutt mentions that on one hand, this was considered a crucial period 
for the CPN (M) as they used all their options—military, social, and political strategies—
in the insurgency.267  
On the other hand, politically this period turned out to be most volatile in 
Nepalese politics with frequent change of governments. As a result, all those frequent 
changes in the government during that period made political parties extremely unpopular 
among the people. Exploiting the failure of all these political parties, Singh maintains that 
the CPN (M) utilized strong political rhetoric, which was effective to mobilize people’s 
aspirations (mostly ethnic community people) against the state.268  
This plan of initiation of the people’s war would be based on the principle 
that everything is an illusion except state power. While remaining firm on 
the principal aim of the armed struggle as to capture political power for 
the people, the Party expresses its firm commitment to wage relentless 
struggle against all forms of deviationist thoughts and trends including 
economism, reformism and anarchism.269 
Thapa explains that the Maoists intensified their guerilla activity by attacking 
police posts in remote areas and seizing weapons and ammunitions.270 At the beginning 
of their insurgency, the Maoists in a way played a sly game by keeping the Nepalese 
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Army out of their way at least until the time they felt they were strong enough to fight 
against them.271 Hence, without any fear of stern military action against them, the 
Maoists attacked the poorly armed and trained police force whose primary responsibility 
was to maintain law and order rather than fighting the insurgents. The government’s late 
decision to mobilize the Army against the insurgents is also seen as the mistake that let 
Maoists to get militarily strengthened. 
Thapa goes on to say that the CPN (M) used the template of the Chinese People’s 
war to continue their insurgency, that is, “strategic defense, strategic balance and 
strategic offence.”272 Sharma recounts that in Maoist ideology, if the rebels can withstand 
the enemy’s strategic offence to continue their insurgency it is considered a strategic 
defense.273 Likewise, he posits that the doctrinal viewpoint of strategic balance would see 
both rebel and the government force at par in terms of fighting strength.274 Similarly, in 
strategic offence the rebels would overwhelm the government forces and force them into 
strategic retreat.275 Thus, the CPN (M) divided its insurgency into various different plans. 
All the slogans in one way or another reflected the political power that intended to 
address people’s grievances. Therefore, these phases have significant political 
implications on Maoist insurgency.  
• First Plan: This phase was meant to establish the Maoist’s agenda in the 
populace so that they could convince the people that their agenda is 
focused to address people’s problems and grievances. Thapa quotes as 
saying their political slogan, “Let us move ahead on the path of the 
people’s war to establish the new people’s democratic state by destroying 
the reactionary state.”276  
• Second Plan: Thapa claims that during this phase the Maoists even 
conducted local elections with the aim of establishing “anti-feudal and 
anti-imperialist [people’s government].”
277
 In fact, this was crucial in 
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gaining the support of people especially ethnic communities who were 
suppressed by limited feudals in the villages.  
• Third Plan: The third plan lasted from June 1996 to June 1997.278 
Sharma maintains that during this time, the government tried desperately 
to quell the Maoist movement and launched a police operation named 
“Kilo Sierra Two.”279 Singh affirms that this operation was seen by many 
villagers as a “state terrorism unleashed by the police … lit the spark for 
an expanding insurgency.”280 There were enormous reports of police 
brutality, misbehavior, extortion in almost all the villages where the 
operation was conducted. Such situation infuriated people (especially 
ethnic communities) to the extent that they were more inclined to Maoists 
agendas that advocated for establishing people’s rights and developing 
people’s lives. Hence, it can be noted that in contrast to the Government’s 
expectation, operation Kilo Sierra Two, instead of quelling the Maoists 
increased Maoists influence and it helped Maoists to use people’s 
grievances.  
• Fourth Plan: After reaching this phase, Maoists were able to convince 
rural peasants that if they did not revolt for their rights then the state 
would adopt a repressive operation like Kilo Sierra Two. As a result, many 
rural youths felt necessary to establish their strongholds. According to 
Thapa, to this end, they created the slogan of “advance in the great 
direction of creating base areas.”281 Besides actively running their 
program inside the country, for the first time the political wing affiliated 
with the Maoists alongside the support of some Indian political 
organizations, which took out a rally in New Delhi, India in 1998.282 It 
was one of their moves to spread their influence in international 
communities as well.  
• Fifth Plan: This plan was in many ways a follow up of the fourth plan, 
which also reiterated to build up their base areas.  
• Sixth Plan: Sharma argues that with the slogan raise to new heights the 
guerrilla war and the people’s resistance struggle, this was one of the 
important phases of Maoists plan as they militarily attacked various police 
outposts, and confiscated weapons and ammunitions.283 The plan lasted 
from July 2000 to February 2001.  
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According to Prem Shahi, after completing different phases, the CPN (M) decided 
to transform its ideology, naming it as “Prachandapath,”284 under its supreme leader 
Pushpa Kamal Dahal, alias Prachanda. (Prachanda in the Nepali language means 
“gigantic and terrifying.”) It was viewed as a part of a psychological motive to deter the 
other political parties and the security forces and to attract people. Thapa asserts that the 
Prachandapath to some extent changed the dynamics of the Maoist insurgency as it 
started to document the party’s ideologies.285 Furthermore, the Maoists’ attack on the 
Army barracks on November 2001 led the government to declare state of emergency.286 
In 2002, the parliament was dissolved and “fresh elections called amid political 
confrontation over extending the state of emergency.”287 The political crisis in Nepal 
deepened after the emergency.  
The Maoists not only relied on their guerilla warfare but, as Upreti points out, 
they also maintained their ‘dialogue strategy’288 with the government and also with other 
democratic parties. The Maoists wanted to convince their supporters (especially ethnic 
communities), cadres, the broader Nepalese people, and also the international 
communities that they were not just focused on insurgency but also equally committed to 
negotiations and talks.  
 The Dialogue and Ceasefire Tactics 2.
During the ten years of insurgency, there were two rounds of peace talks and 
ceasefire, in 2001 and 2003. Upreti asserts that the Maoists used the tactics of “fight and 
dialogue with the government at the same time,”289 borrowed from Shining Path rebels of 
Peru. One of the reasons for Maoists to come to negotiations could be that they wanted to 
prove to their cadres that they are loyal to their agendas. Likewise, as Thapa mentions, 
284 Prem Shahi, “Prachanda: The Mastermind behind the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal” (master’s 
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the Maoists wanted to prove to other political parties that they were different from all the 
other democratic parties including the left parties.290  
In addition, Singh posits that after the royal massacre in 2001, when many 
members of the royal family, including the king and the queen, were gunned down, 
allegedly by the drunken crown prince over the issues of his choice of marriage partner, 
the influence of the palace in Nepalese politics become meager.291 He further mentions 
that the Maoists had the leverage of accepting dialogue opportunity that gave them time 
to rearrange their strength.292  
a. First Round of Peace Talks 
As Upreti highlights, the first round of peace talks that was held on August 30, 
2001, was not successful as neither negotiating party had a specific and clear agenda.293 
Furthermore, he goes on to say that Prachanda and the secretary of CPN (UML), Madhav 
Nepal met at Siliguri, India, where Prachanda’s “proposal of constituting a Constituent 
Assembly”294 was denied by the CPN (UML).  
As the first round of talks ended on November 21, 2001, Thapa points out that 
there was massive surge in Maoist Violence alongside the political instability in the 
country.295 He further notes that the Maoists made the condition that they would sit for 
the dialogue with the government only if the government adhered to their demands on 
“Constituent Assembly election, Republic Nepal and the interim constitution.”296  
b.  Second Round of Peace Talks 
Although the Maoists were never serious about peace talks, they participated in 
the second round of peace talks on January 2003. The second round of talks compared to 
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the first round was more active in terms of political movements.297 In this period the 
government and the Maoists agreed on not using force against each other and observed 
complete ceasefire.  
The Maoists benefitted particularly from the talks. Upreti notes that the release of 
some Maoists from jail and the confinement of the then-Royal Nepalese Army’s 
movement to within a five-kilometer radius from their specific camps were some 
examples of their achievement.298 However, there was no substantial improvement on the 
talks and thus it could not produce any positive result to solve the insurgency problem. 
As a consequence, the Maoists declared an end to the seven-month ceasefire, blaming the 
government for not taking the peace talks seriously.299  
The peace talks during the insurgency cannot be evaluated just as a means to 
settle the problem but also as evidence that the Maoists were able to engage the 
government in their strategy. The Maoists were clear on the outcome of the peace talks as 
they knew that the government and the parliamentarian parties would not accept their 
proposal, thus by and large, the Maoists were determined to use the peace talks as a tool 
to gain their political objective.300  
According to Upreti, politically, the Maoists were able to establish their position 
as a party that was seeking major changes on social, economic and political front—not 
just the government.301 This development was the biggest blow to all other democratic 
parties who had been wrangling for decades about reforming and bringing down the 
government. The use of the dialogue strategy by Maoists gained tremendous support 
from the people, mainly the ethnic communities.  
Thapa posit that the Maoists continuously attracted ethnic communities by raising 
their expectations on uplifting their living standards and by convincing them to establish 
297 Thapa and Sijapati, A Kingdom under Siege, 167. 
298 Upreti, Maoists in Nepal, 122. 
299 Ibid., 123–124.  
300 Thapa, A kingdom under Seige, 178. 
301 Ibid., 122. 
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their political rights in the state.302 The Maoist movement was much more effective in 
the villages as there was no presence of government officials after the beginning of the 
insurgency. Singh maintains that in all these events that were unfolding from 1990, the 
people’s grievances against the government, the social elites, and also against the social 
discrimination based on language and ethnicity was in the apex.303 For this reason, the 
Maoist agenda on ethnic demands garnered the support of this large group of 
marginalized people. 
C. MAOIST ETHNIC DEMANDS  
Before beginning their insurgency, the Maoists submitted their 40-point demands 
to the then-prime ministers, which included several social welfare demands. Thapa notes 
that many of those demands were almost identical to the political commitments of 
centrist parties like the NC and CPN (UML).304 The other parties considered such 
demands as only a part of their election campaign. The demands had different political 
connotations for the Maoists—and their followers. According to Thapa, some of the 
salient points of the 40 demands raised the expectations of marginalized ethnic 
communities.  
Discrimination against downtrodden and backward people should be 
stopped. The system of untouchability should eliminate. All languages and 
dialects should be given equal opportunities to prosper. The right to 
education in the mother tongue up to higher levels should be guaranteed. 
Regional discrimination between the hills and the tarai should be 
eliminated. Backward areas should be given regional autonomy. Rural and 
Urban areas should be treated at par. All racial exploitation and 
suppression should be stopped. Where ethnic communities are in the 
majority, they should be allowed to form their own autonomous 
governments. Patriarchal exploitation and discrimination against women 
should be stopped. Daughters should be allowed access to paternal 
property.305  
302  Thapa, “The Making of the Maoist Insurgency,” 49.   
303 Singh, Nepal: Struggle for Democracy, 275. 
304 Thapa and Sijapati, A Kingdom under Siege, 53.   
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The ethnic community, which always considered itself as deprived citizens was, 
inclined toward the Maoists’ agendas because of their commitment to the marginalized 
people’s problems. Upreti points out that as the ethnic community makes up 37.3 percent 
of the population, their favor toward the Maoist’s agenda was crucial to lift the intensity 
of the Maoists movement.306  
Lawoti explain that the Maoist party, which started the “campaign against the 
caste system and ethnic prejudice and resisted imposition of compulsory Sanskrit in 
Schools, a language alien to most indigenous groups,”307 seemed to be more involved in 
the issues of ethnic communities. According to Singh, this is how the Maoists 
successfully exploited “mood of discontent to their advantage by promising the Nepalese 
people a better future.”308 In fact, each of the Maoist strategies carefully incorporated 
agendas that would reflect people’s grievances. The CPN (M) craftily used social, 
economic, and political fora to disseminate their agenda among these populations.  
 Social Agenda 1.
One of the CPN (M) social reform agenda items was the use of land. According to 
Thomax Cox, the land rights issues in Nepal demonstrates that there have been always 
conflict between “dominant high-caste Hindus and some ethnic minorities”309 over the 
issue of land ownership. Madhav Joshi and T. David Mason mention that even the 
electoral democracy in 1990 could not provide “relief from clientelist dependency”310 to 
the minorities. They further assert that as the disparity of “poorest 40 percent of 
agricultural households control[ling] only 9 percent of cultivatable land, while the 
306 Upreti, Maoists in Nepal, 79. 
307 Mahendra Lawoti, “Ethnic dimensions of the Maoist insurgencies,” in The Maoist Insurgency in 
Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century, ed. Mahendra Lawoti and Anup Pahari (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2010), 142.  
308 Singh, Nepal: Struggle for Democracy, 273.  
309 Thomas Cox, “Land Rights and Ethnic Conflict in Nepal,” Economic and Political Weekly 25, no. 
24/25 (June 16–23, 1990): 1318. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4396401. 
310 Madhav Joshi and T. David Mason, “Between Democracy and Revolution: Peasant Support for 
Insurgency versus Democracy,” Nepal Journal of Peace Research 45, no. 6 (November 2008): 781, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/27640768. 
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wealthiest 6 percent of landowners control[ling] more than 33 percent of farm land”311 
remained same even after governments land reform legislation in 1990, people’s (mostly 
ethnic minorities) grievances continued to increase.  
The CPN (M) correctly utilized this situation to their advantage. One of their 
platforms regarding the use of land according to Thapa was that “land should belong to 
‘tenants’ [and] land under the control of the feudal system should be should be 
confiscated and distributed to the landless and homeless.”312 He further mentions that 
such agendas raised the expectations of marginalized people. Similarly, the Maoists’ 
advocacy for the end of social discrimination, and reservation rights for the people was 
equally effective among the ethnic communities.313 Likewise, he posits that ethnic 
communities demanded Nepal be declared a secular state and also demanded respect for 
indigenous languages, as Nepali was the national language.314  
Similarly, the Maoists’ popular ban on gambling and alcohol was another 
prominent campaign. According to Shah, the banning of alcohol garnered public support 
in reducing domestic and social violence.315 He further observes that before the Maoists’ 
ban, the government was ignorant about the aspects of social crimes and corruptions 
related to the alcohol industries.316 Thus, the CPN (M) was able to exploit the popular 
desire of general public who wanted either to control or ban alcohol. Similar to the CPN 
(M) social reform agenda their economic reform agenda was also able to attract ethnic 
communities’ sympathy for their insurgency. 
 Economic Agenda 2.
After the 1990 multiparty democracy, the Nepalese people were over-ambitious to 
improve their economic conditions. In contrast, it was believed that the political parties 
311 Joshi and Mason, “Between Democracy and Revolution,” 766. 
312 Thapa and Sijapati, A Kingdom under Siege, 192. 
313 Ibid. 
314 Ibid. 
315 Shah, “The Other Side of the Alcohol Economy,” 133. 
316 Ibid. 
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did not even have any “plan or program ready at hand to fight for in order to meet the 
aspiration of people,”317 according to BBC. Moreover, in comparison to other 
communities, marginalized people did not see any substantial changes in their lives 
before and after 1990. This fact raised their grievances against the government in 
particular and against the democracy in general. Thapa posits that the CPN (M) 
demanded that the “poor farmers should be exempted from the loan repayments.”318 This 
exemption would include the farmer’s loan from government banks as well. The CPN 
(M) also sought “fixed wages to the workers in industries, and agriculture,”319 a popular 
agenda among these constituents.  
In a country where much of the population depends on agriculture and where the 
bulk of poor peasants come from the ethnic communities (with huge debts to land owners 
and money-lenders mostly from high-caste Hindus), such economically viable agendas of 
the CPN (M) would have been crucial in attracting ethnic community. The influence of 
the Maoist economic agenda among the ethnic communities was such that even after the 
government announced its “special economic programme to improve the living 
conditions of the country’s twenty-five least developed districts,”320 the attraction of 
marginalized people’s affiliation to Maoist’s economic reform agenda did not change at 
all. This use of ethnic grievances was another achievement for the CPN (M) towards 
attaining their political goal.  
 Political Agenda 3.
According to Joanna Pfaff-Czarnecka, the disenchantment of the people for the 
lack of development and the change they were expecting after restoration of democracy 
in 1990 was so high that they felt the political movement only changed the regime but not 
317 “Nepal’s Misunderstood Movement,” BBC News, June 4, 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/5034468.stm.   
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the system.321 In general, people’s dissatisfaction over the party politics, corruption, 
nepotism, and frequent government’s changes was defamed the significance of 
democracy. This general resentment on part of the people provided right time for the 
CPN (M) to inject their radical political agenda.322  
Thapa mentions that while the Maoists agenda was popular among the people, the 
government’s decision to use force to suppress the Maoist movement resulted in “the 
killings of Maoists and their supporters—as well as civilians caught in the middle—[and] 
escalated to unprecedented heights.”323 According to Sharma, ironically, on many 
occasions “innocents far outnumbered Maoist rebels.”324 This situation created huge 
mistrust of the police force. Thapa notes that in 2001, when a nationwide opinion poll 
was conducted, about 30 percent believed that the Nepal police force was responsible for 
the increased number of Maoists in the country because of their unprecedented brutality 
during the operation.325 It was a great bonus for the CPN (M) to reinforce their 
convictions to the people that fighting against the state is the only means to establish the 
people’s government that will take care of their grievances.  
Under such circumstances, Upreti asserts that “the Maoists as political strategists 
tried to in-cash the conditions in order to move further for the attainment of their political 
objectives.”326 Furthermore, Thapa maintains that one of the Maoists’ political 
commitments to attract innocent and marginalized people, reflected in their 40-point 
demands, was the release of the people who were “arrested extra-judicially for political 
reasons”327 during police operations.  
321 Pfaff-Czarnecka, “High Expectations,” 169–170. 
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D. MAOIST FAILURE TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM 
The CPN (M), after coming to mainstream politics, made good impressions on the 
ethnic communities as people had huge expectations from the CPN (M), considering it as 
a true revolutionary party. The result of the 2008 constituent assembly election surprised 
many people. The former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, who was an election observer, 
called the election results “a total transformation in the form of government from a 240-
year-old Hindu monarchy to a democratic republic.”328 
The Maoists also insisted on their commitment to democracy and later did form 
the government, shifting from a party in movement to a party in power. However, the 
Maoists’ actions during their nine-month stay in the government completely diverged 
from the revolutionary ideologies they held during 10 years of insurgency. In contrast, 
the Maoists, too, were actively involved in power politics like other parties. This fact led 
the people to see the Maoists’ real intent of coming to power, which further made them 
unpopular among the people.  
A party that waged ten years of insurgency, aiming to bring drastic social, 
political and economic change, failed to “strike a chord with ordinary people across the 
country,”329 states the BBC. Then the Maoists ignored the grievances of ethnic minorities 
who were crucial for their victory in the 2008 election. Following their failure to provide 
“radical policies for a country renowned for its conservatism and tolerance,”330 the 
Maoists suffered a humiliating defeat in the second constitution election in 2013.  
According to Joshi and Mason, it was surprising to many that the party that was 
able to “mobilize peasants for armed insurgency … could not mobilize them to vote for 
them in democratic elections.”331 Many political analysts believe that the Maoists’ 
328 “Nepal’s Maoists Lead Poll Count,” BBC News, April 12, 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7341944.stm. 
329 “Nepal’s Maoists Digest Impending Electoral Wipe-out,” BBC News, November 21, 2013, 
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strategy to use people’s grievances to attain political goals cost them dearly in the 2013 
second constitutional election.  
An analysis from Muma Ram Khanal, a former central member of the Maoist 
party during the conflict, explains the Maoist defeat:  
It is true that secularism, federal republicanism, and the formation of a 
Constituent Assembly were mainly Maoist agendas which won support of 
the people in 2008 because voters thought that these would bring peace. 
But after seeing the arrogance of the Maoists in power, voters figured out 
that the promises were just slogans. Maoist supporters and ex-fighters who 
had sacrificed all, had been wounded or suffered during the conflict asked: 
“What was it all for?” They had seen the party leadership siphon off 
allowances and compensation meant for them and the elections provided 
the perfect opportunity to exact revenge.332 
Hence, when the CPN (M) failed to deliver on the promises given to the ethnic 
communities during insurgency, the people vented their anger in the election against the 
Maoists. The Maoists in a way were boomeranged by the same ethnic grievances, which 
formerly had elevenated their political status.  
E. CONCLUSION 
The restoration of multiparty democracy in Nepal in 1990 aroused many 
expectations among the people. However, as party politics dominated national politics, 
the social, economic, and political problems further deepened and were sidelined. This 
development fueled frustration on the part of the people and, most importantly, of the 
marginalized ethnic communities.  
This was the situation of Nepalese politics when the Maoists started their 
insurgency. In the beginning, the right use of ethnic grievances backed by popular social 
reform agendas worked for the Maoists. Even after joining mainstream politics, people 
believed that the Maoists would deliver their promises. Because of this belief, the 
Maoists’ journey from bullet to ballot was impressive. However, when they were in the 
government, they could not fulfill the expectations and promises they had given to the 
332 Muma Ram Khanal, “Post-Mortem of a Defeat,” Nepali Times, November 29–December 5, 2013, 
http://nepalitimes.com/regular-columns/Inside-Out/Post-mortem-of-a-defeat,201. 
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ethnic communities. The CPN (M), like other democratic political parties, easily got 
swayed by a mismatch between ideology and practice. As a result, the CPN (M) not only 
lost the election but also lost its image of being a revolutionary party. This defeat was 
considered a political failure of the Maoists.   
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V. CONCLUSION 
Nepal’s ethnic animosities seem to have begun alongside its unification. 
According to Prayag Raj Sharma the old code of 1854, which created a “four-fold 
classification of society,”333 was further deepened when the Hindu religion came into 
play in politics and society. The religion further segregated castes into touchable and 
untouchable categories. Such discrimination not only irked ethnic communities, but 
raised their grievances to an apex.  
However, those discriminatory practices were sublimated, if not completely 
changed, once the Maoists blended ethnic grievances into their violent movement. 
Having raised the issue of ethnic rights and grievances, the Maoist party emerged as the 
messiah for the downtrodden and under-represented ethnic people. Especially in the 
villages, some of the Maoists’ radical movements such as banning of alcohol, forcible 
entry of untouchables into the temples and also into the houses of elites or touchable 
persons, and confiscation of land property, transferring it from landowners to land users, 
established them as a true revolutionary party. 
Under these circumstances, the Maoists effectively used ethnic grievances and 
achieved their intended political goals by becoming the largest party in the country’s first 
constitutional elections in 2008. However, their journey from rebels to major political 
stakeholders could not last long, once the population (most importantly, ethnic 
communities) realized that their past revolutionary practices completely mismatched their 
power-centered political activities. The Maoists strayed from their promised ideological 
commitment, which maintained that their “armed struggle will be conducted by taking 
agrarian revolution as the axis and by relying on the laboring masses, particularly the 
poor peasants.”334  
In addition, the party claimed that it would “never and under no circumstances 
succumb to the pressures, threats and enticements of the internal and external reactionary 
333 Prayag Raj Sharma, “Nepal: Hindu-Tribal Interface,” Contributions to Nepalese Studies 6, no. 1 
(1978),4.  
334 Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists), “Theoretical Premises.” 
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forces.”335 As a result, underrepresented and downtrodden ethnic communities who 
trusted the Maoists’ political agenda in the past reversed their support and voted them out 
in the 2013 second constitution election. The Maoists’ political strategy to use ethnic 
grievances for their political goals caused them to lose central gravity from the national 
politics. In fact, the rise and fall of the Maoist party in Nepalese politics left some 
concerns regarding the contentious issues of ethnic grievances that are still unresolved.  
One of the significant aspects of the Maoist movement in Nepalese politics is that, 
unlike in other parts of the world, this problem entered country’s politics after the 
restoration of democracy in 1990. Normally, the people or political parties revolt either to 
bring or restore some specific form of political change, as opposed to the Maoist party, 
which participated in parliamentary elections, and afterwards walked out to wage their 
movement. The Maoist party that impressively won nine seats in the 1991 parliamentary 
election resorted to a violent movement.  
So the concern arises: Was there a built-in fault line in Nepal’s democracy that 
could not accommodate various political parties’ parliamentary practices? In some ways, 
the answer is yes, as the parties could not fully overcome the long-practiced power-
centered politics. Politically, these concerns enable the democracy to get further 
strengthened if past mistakes are corrected in the present.  
Historically, the continuation of power-centered politics in Nepal (among the 
King, NC, and CPN [UML]), even after 1990, frustrated the people’s aspirations in 
general and riled ethnic communities in particular. Under such circumstances, if not the 
Maoists, some other politically ambitious parties or groups would likely have begun 
some form of extremist activities. Such a volatile situation proves that there was the built-
in fault line of Nepal’s democracy, which, instead of changing the system only changed 
the political players, that is, from king to political leaders. Similarly, when the Maoists 
submitted their 40-point social reformist agenda to the government in 1995, the then 
prime minister from the Nepali Congress completely failed to tackle the situation. This 
incident also signifies the incapacity of leadership to rightly understand the problem. 
335 Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists), “Theoretical Premises.” 
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Given the existing power-centered politics, and the weaknesses of political 
leadership, chances are slim that political parties would be able to resolve ethnic 
grievances. Even the Maoists who put ethnic grievances at the forefront of their struggle 
did not uphold their promised ideological stance after coming to power. Thus, it becomes 
less promising that other parties who did not make any changes on ethnic grievances, 
despite their frequent stay in power since 1990, would resolve the problem. Therefore, 
solving ethnic grievances under the current political environment seems bleak and 
uncertain for governments in future.  
As enormous problems regarding development, and other issues besides ethnic 
grievances, were stalled during the Maoist movement, it would not be easy for any 
government to aim to achieve sustainable peace, stability, and development in the coming 
years. Furthermore, as the issues of ethnic grievances have now become the main 
political agendas for various political parties, conflict of ideology and practice of power-
centered politics to fulfill party interests remain crucial. The friction between those who 
want radical changes, like the Maoists, and those who want sustainable moderate 
changes, like the Nepali Congress, seems to continue in Nepalese politics. 
In the bigger picture, Nepal’s Maoist movement remains a good case study for 
countries that have issues related to ethnic identity. The Maoist movement reveals how 
ethnic grievances can determine Nationalism. In other words, there can be one nation, 
one flag; yet a separate identity among different ethnic communities is necessary to 
maintain national unity. If the country fails to maintain a balance, then a country may 
face a severe conflict like that of Nepal.  
In sum, even though Maoists used ethnic grievances to attain political goals, they 
brought in the invisible, but crucial issues of ethnic grievances into the national political 
limelight. Their movement in one or another way influenced other major political parties 
to rethink and change their political courses of action, that is, from power-centered 
politics to national politics. This point can be considered the major impact of the Maoist 
movement on Nepal’s political environment. Finally, at present, where the political 
stagnation over the issue of ethnic communities and grievances still remains unclear and 
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unresolved in Nepalese politics, a sustainable political approach is required to solve the 
issues: a vital task to execute in Nepalese politics.  
 70 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Acharaya, Anurag. “No War no Peace.” In Nepali Times, April 15- 21, 2011. 
http://nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=18108#.VPXa9a85A5s 
Beetham, David. “Conditions for Democratic Consolidation.” Review of African Political 
Economy 21, no. 60 (June 1994): 159. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4006202. 
Bhattachan, Krishna B. “Ethnopolitics and ethnodevelopment: An emerging paradigm in 
Nepal.” In   Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nepal: Identities and Mobilization 
after 1990, edited by Mahendra Lawoti and Susan Hangen. NY and London: 
Routledge, 2013. 
Bohora, Rameshowr. “Maoist Insecurity.” In Nepali Times, March 19–25, 2010. 
http://nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=16899#.VG2EIK8tAic. 
Brown, T. Louise. The Challenge to Democracy in Nepal, vol. 10. New York, US: 
Routledge, 2002. 
Chadda, Maya. Building Democracy in South Asia: India, Nepal, Pakistan. Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner, 2000. 
Cox, Thomas. “Land Rights and Ethnic Conflict in Nepal.” Economic and Political 
Weekly 25, no. 24/25 (June 16–23, 1990): 1318. http://www.jstor.org/stable/
4396401  
Dastider, Molica. “Refusing to choose:The Muslim Madhesis and the coexistence of 
religious and regional identity in Nepal’s Terai.” In  Nationalism and Ethnic 
Conflict in Nepal: Identities and Mobilization after 1990, edited by Mahendra 
Lawoti and Susan Hangen. NYand London: Routledge, 2013. 
Diamond, Larry. Developing Democracy towards Consolidation. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2011.  
“Economic Programme for Nepal’s Least Developed Districts.” BBC News, October 30, 
1998. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/204771.stm. 
Folmar, Steven. “Problems of identity for Hill Dalits and Nepal’s nationalist project.” In 
Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nepal: Identities and Mobilization after 1990, 
edited by Mahendra Lawoti and Susan Hangen. NY and London: Routledge, 
2013. 
Fürer-Haimendorf, Christoph von. “The inter-relations of castes and ethnic groups in 
Nepal.” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 20, no. 1 (1957): 
245. http://www.jstor.org/stable/610377. 
 71 
Ganguly, Sumit, and Brian Shoup. “Nepal: Between Dictatorship and Anarchy.” Journal 
of Democracy 16, no. 4 (2005): 132. doi:10.1353/jod.2005.0062. 
Gellner, David N. “Caste, Ethnicity and Inequality in Nepal.” Economic and Political 
Weekly 42, no. 20 (2007): 1823–1826. www.jstor.org/Stable/4419601. 
Government of Nepal. Interim Constitution 2007, 8. http://www.nepal.gov.np/
NepalGEAPortalp=WebContent/NLC&n=InterimConstitutionOfNepal.html. 
Hachhethu, Krishna. “Madheshi Nationalism and Restructuring the Nepali State.” Paper 
presented at a seminar on Constitutionalism and Diversity in Nepal, organized by 
Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies, Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu, 2007: 
22–24.  
Hangen, I. Susan. The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Nepal: Democracy in the Margins. 
London and New York: Routledge, 2010. 
———. Creating a “New Nepal”: The Ethnic Dimension. Washington, DC: East-West 
Center Washington, 2007. http://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/handle/
10125/3513/ps034.pdf. 
Horowitz, Donald L. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1985. 
Hsiung, James Chieh. The Logic of Maoism. New York: Praeger, 1974. 
Hugh, Seton-Watson. “The Russian and Chinese Revolutions.” The China Quarterly, no. 
2 (April–June, 1960): 45. http://www.jstor.org/stable/651439. 
Huntington, Samuel P. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. 
Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. 
Hutt, Michael. Himalayan People’s War: Nepal’s Maoist Rebellion. Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Press, 2004. 
Joanna, Pfaff-Czarnecka. “High Expectations, Deep Disappointment: Politics, State and 
Society in Nepal after 1990.” In Himalayan People’s War: Nepal’s Maoist 
Rebellion, edited by Michael Hurst. Bloomington, IN: Indiana Press, 2004. 
Johnson, Chalmers A. Autopsy on People’s War. Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1973. 
Joshi, Madhav, and T. David Mason. “Between Democracy and Revolution: Peasant 
Support for Insurgency Versus Democracy in Nepal.” Journal of Peace Research 
45, no. 6 (2008): 781. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27640768. 
 72 
Khadka, Narayan. “Crisis in Nepal’s Partyless Panchayat System: The Case for More 
Democracy.” Pacific Affairs 59, no. 3 (Autumn 1986): 429. http://www.jstor.org/
stable/2758328. 
Khanal, Muma Ram. “Post-Mortem of a Defeat.” In Nepali Times, November 29–
December 5, 2013. http://nepalitimes.com/regular-columns/Inside-Out/Post-
mortem-of-a-defeat,201. 
Kumar, Satish. “The Nepalese Monarchy from 1769 to 1951.” International Studies 4, 
no. 1 (1962): 49. doi:10.1177/002088176200400103. 
Lawoti, Mahendra. “Ethnic Politics and the Building of an Inclusive State.” In Nepal in 
Transition: From People’s War to Fragile Peace edited by Sebastian Von 
Einsiedel, David M. Malone, and Suman Pradhan. NY: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012. 
———. “Ethnic dimensions of the Maoist insurgencies.” In The Maoist Insurgency in 
Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century, edited by Mahendra Lawoti and 
Anup Pahari. NY and London : Routledge, 2010. 
———. “Evolution and growth of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal” in The Maoist 
Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century edited by  Mahendra 
Lawoti and Anup Pahari. NY and London: Routledge, 2010. 
Lecomte-Tilouine, Marie. Hindu Kingship, Ethnic Revival, and Maoist Rebellion in 
Nepal. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. 
Levine, Nancy E. “Caste, State, and Ethnic Boundaries in Nepal.” The Journal of Asian 
Studies 46, no. 1 (1987): 74. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2056667. 
Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan. Problem of the Democratic Transition and 
Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. 
Lipset, Seymour Martin. Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1988.  
Lohani, S. C. “The Birth of Rana Feudalism in Nepal.” Ancient Nepal 8 (1989): 49. 
http://himalaya.socanth.cam.ac.uk/collections/journals/ancientnepal/pdf/
ancient_nepal_08_07.pdf. 
Menzardo, Andrew E., and Keshav Prashad Sharma. “Cost-Cutting Caste and 
Community: A look at Thakali Social Reform in Pokhara.” Contributions to 
Nepalese Studies 2, no. 2 (1975): 25–26. http://himalaya.socanth.cam.ac.uk/
collections/journals/contributions/pdf/CNAS_02_02_02.pdf. 
 73 
Morlino, Leonardo. “Democratic Consolidation: Definition and Models.” In Transition to 
Democracy: Comparative Perspectives from Southern Europe, Latin America and 
Eastern Europe, edited by Geoffrey Pridham. Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth 
Publishing Company, 1995. 
Nickson, R. Andrew. “Democratisation and the Growth of Communism in Nepal: A 
Peruvian Scenario in the Making.” In Understanding the Maoist Movement of 
Nepal, edited by Deepak Thapa. Kathmandu: Martin Chautari, 2003. 
“Nepal’s Maoists Digest Impending Electoral Wipe-out.” BBC News, November 21, 
2013. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-25034461. 
“Nepal’s Maoists Lead Poll Count.” BBC News, April 12, 2008. http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/south_asia/7341944.stm. 
Parajulee, Ramjee P. The Democratic Transition in Nepal. Boston: Rowman Littlefield, 
2000. 
Phadnis, Urmila. “The Politics of Referendum,” Pacific Affairs 54, no. 3 (1981): 439. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2756788. 
Poudyal, Shantosh B. “Explaining the Success of Nepal Communist Party—(NCP-M): A 
Comparison of the Maoist Insurgencies in the 21st Century.” Master’s thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2010. 
Pradhan, P. R. “Some Legends about King Mahendra–2” People’s Review, October 9, 
2013. http://www.peoplesreview.com.np/index.php/articles/those-were-the-days/
item/282-some-legends-about-king-mahendra-2. 
Regmi, D. R. The Nepali Democratic Struggle: Its Aim and Character, statement to the 
Nepali National [sic] Congress (1948), 1. 
Roka, Hari. “The Emergency and Nepal’s Political Future.” In Himalayan People’s War: 
Nepal’s Maoist Rebellion, edited by Michael Hurst. Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
Press, 2004. 
Rose, Leo E., and John T. Scholz. Nepal: Profile of a Himalayan Kingdom. Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1980. 
Rustov, Dankwart A. “Transition to Democracy toward Dynamic model.” In Transition 
to Democracy: Comparative Perspectives from Southern Europe, Latin America 
and Eastern Europe, edited by Geoffrey Pridham. Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth 
Publishing Company, 1995. 
Sales, Anne de. “The Kham Magar Country, Nepal: Between Ethnic Claims and 
Maoism.” In Understanding the Maoist Movement of Nepal, edited by Deepak 
Thapa. Kathmandu: Martin Chautari, 2003. 
 74 
Sarukkai, Sundar. “Phenomenology of Untouchability.” Economic and Political Weekly 
44, no. 37 (September 12–18, 2009): 39. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25663542. 
Schmitter, Philippe C., and Terry Lynn Karl. “What Democracy Is … And Is Not.” In 
Transition to Democracy: Comparative Perspectives from Southern Europe, Latin 
America and Eastern Europe, edited by Geoffrey Pridham. Brookfield, VT: 
Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1995. 
Shah, Saubhagya. “The Other Side of the Alcohol Economy.” In Understanding the 
Maoist Movement of Nepal, edited by Deepak Thapa. Kathmandu: Martin 
Chautari, 2003. 
Shahi, Prem. “Prachanda: The Mastermind behind the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal.” 
Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010. 
Sharma, Prayag Raj. “Nepal: Hindu-tribal interface.” Contributions to Nepalese Studies 
6, no. 1 (1978): 1–14. 
Sharma, Sudheer. “The Maoist Movement: An Evolutionary Perspective.” In Himalayan 
People’s War: Nepal’s Maoist Rebellion, edited by Michael Hurst. Bloomington, 
IN: Indiana University Press, 2004. 
Shrestha, Anita. “Dalits in Nepal: Story of Discrimination.” FOCUS 30 (December 
2002): 1–3. http://lighthousenepal.org/about/dalit-caste.pdf. 
Siegle, Joseph T., Michael M. Weinstein, and Morton H. Halperin. “Why Democracies 
Excel.” Foreign Affairs 83, no.5 (September–October, 2004): 57. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20034067. 
Sijapati, Bandita.” In Pursuit of Recognition: Regionalism, Madeshi Identity and the 
Madhes Andolan.” In  Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nepal: Identities and 
Mobilization after 1990, edited by Mahendra Lawoti and Susan Hangen. NY and 
London: Routledge, 2013. 
Singh, Shiv Bahadur. Nepal: Struggle for Democracy. New Delhi: Adhyan Publishers, 
2007. 
Thapa, Deepak. “The Making of the Maoist Insurgency.” In Nepal in Transition: From 
People’s War to Fragile Peace, edited by Sebastian von Einsiedel, David M. 
Malone, and Suman Pradhan. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 
Thapa, Deepak, and Bandita Sijapati. A Kingdom under Siege: Nepal’s Maoist 
Insurgency, 1996 to 2003. Kathmandu: The Print House, 2003. 
Upreti, Bishnu Raj. Political Change and Challenges of Nepal, vol. 2. Saarbrucken, 
Germany: LAP Lambert Academic Publishing, 2010. 
 
 75 
Upreti, Bhuwan Chandra. Maoists in Nepal: From Insurgency to Political Mainstream. 
Delhi, India: Kalpaz, 2008. 
United Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist). “Theoretical Premises for the Historic 
Initiation of the People’s War.” September 10, 1995. http://ucpnmaoist.org/
PageDetails.aspx?id=340&cat=4#.VMxxXa85AiQ. 
Von Einsiedel, Sebastian, David M. Malone, and Suman Pradhan. Nepal in Transition: 
From People’s War to Fragile Peace. New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2012. 
World Bank, Department for International Development (DFID). “Unequal Citizens: 
Gender, Caste, and Ethnic Exclusion in Nepal,” 5.  
  
 76 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 77 
